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OLD DICTIONARIES AND NEW TEXTUALISTS
Rickie Sonpal*
INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Lopez,' the Supreme Court held unconstitutional
a federal statute because it exceeded Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause.2 Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion urging
the Court to further "temper [its] Commerce Clause jurisprudence in
a manner that ... is more faithful to the original understanding of that
Clause."3  Central to Thomas's conception of the original
understanding of the Commerce Clause was what he perceived to be
the former understanding of the word "commerce." 4 The meaning of
"commerce," he argued, has changed since the framing.5 According
to Thomas, when the Constitution was ratified, "'commerce' consisted
of selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these
purposes";6 it did not include "productive activities" like manufacture
and agriculture.7 As the primary support for this definition, Thomas
quotated from three dictionaries contemporary with the Constitution:
a 1773 edition of Samuel Johnson's A Dictionary of the English
Language, a 1789 edition of Nathaniel Bailey's An Universal
Etymological English Dictionary, and a 1796 edition of Thomas
Sheridan's A Complete Dictionary of the English Language.8 Thomas
rested his concurrence on the definition of "commerce" that he
extracted from these dictionaries.
* J.D. candidate, 2004, Fordham University School of Law. I thank Martin Flaherty
and David Yerkes for their comments and suggestions and for many inspiring
conversations.
1. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
2. See id.
3. Id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring).
4. Id. at 586 (Thomas, J., concurring).
5. Id. at 587 (Thomas, J., concurring).
6. Id. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring).
7. Id. at 586 (Thomas, J., concurring).
8. See id. at 585-86 (Thomas, J., concurring). From Johnson's definition of
"commerce," Thomas quoted "lntercour[s]e [sic]; exchange of one thing for another;
interchange of any thing; trade; traffick"; from Bailey, "trade or traffic"; and from
Sheridan, "Exchange of one thing for another; trade, traffick." Id. at 586 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Thomas bolstered these dictionary definitions with a few carefully
chosen quotations and, bizarrely, the etymology of the word "commerce." Id.
(Thomas, J., concurring).
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Thomas's definition of "commerce" has not failed to elicit response.
Herbert Hovenkamp, for one, challenges that definition.' Working
within Thomas's "particular methodology of constitutional
interpretation,""' Hovenkamp finds a different meaning of
"commerce." 1' Hovenkamp contends that the meaning of
"commerce," as understood at the time of the framing, was "far
broader" than Thomas accepted "and included manufacturing and
economic activity generally."' 2 Hovenkamp supports this broader
definition of "commerce" with contemporary usage of Adam Smith,
Alexander Hamilton, and the framers. 3 According to Hovenkamp,
these men used the word "commerce" in ways irreconcilable with
Thomas's narrow definition. 4 Hovenkamp also provides his own
definition from an old dictionary-he quotes Noah Webster's 1828 An
American Dictionary of the English Language."' Hovenkamp's
definition, derived according to the same methodology as Thomas's,
does not support Thomas's conclusion. Hovenkamp's broader
definition accordingly grants Congress broader power than Thomas's
does.
Both Thomas and Hovenkamp seek to determine how the word
"commerce" was understood at the time of the framing. Working
within the same methodological framework, the two reach contrary
understandings of the word. The only differences in their analyses lie
in their sources. Whereas Thomas based his conception of the
contemporary understanding of the word primarily on contemporary
dictionary definitions, Hovenkamp supports his definition with a
broader sampling of usages. The difference in results is significant:
were Thomas to accept Hovenkamp's definition of "commerce," his
concurring opinion would lose its force, and he would have to allow
Congress broader powers under the Commerce Clause.
As the nation's body of law ages, parts of it become increasingly
foreign to the modern reader. This alienation is due in part to the
inevitable changes of language, particularly to the change of the
meanings of words. Those judges who consider the original
understanding of a statute binding require some tool to assist them in
understanding how the statute and the words it comprises would have
been understood at the time the statute was enacted. For such a tool,
judges often turn to dictionaries contemporary with the statute,
9. Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The
Supreme Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 2213, 2227-
36(1996).
10. Id. at 2229.
11. Id. at 2230.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2229-30.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2229. Webster defined "commerce" as "intercourse between individuals;
interchange of work, business." Id.
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trusting the dictionary to offer a clear and convenient snapshot of the
meanings a word may have borne at the time the statute was
enacted.6
16. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 778 (2003); id. at 804 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Utah v. Evans, 122 S. Ct. 2191, 2205 (2002); id. at 2214 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); J.E.M. Agric. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-
Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 146 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring); INS v. St. Cyr, 533
U.S. 289, 337 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 n.1
(2001); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 332 (2001); United States v.
Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 50-51 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring); Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S.
494, 504 (2000); AMOCO Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 874-76
(1999); Dep't of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316,
346-47 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,
524 U.S. 569, 595 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S.
321, 335 (1998); Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div. v. United Auto.,
Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 523 U.S. 653, 656-57 (1998);
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 264 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 400-01 (1998); Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 71
(1997); Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 637-38 (1997)
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1996);
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 857-58 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 700 (1995); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-87 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,
513 U.S. 561, 575-76 (1995); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 227-
28 (1994); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 854-55 (1994) (Blackmun, J., concurring);
id. at 859 (Thomas, J., concurring); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764,
781, 801 (1993); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 614 n.7 (1993); Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 38 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Nixon v. United States,
506 U.S. 224, 229-32 (1993); Rowland v. Cal. Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 199, 203
(1993); Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77-78 (1992); Molzof v. United States,
502 U.S. 301, 307 (1992); Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 920 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991); Moskal v. United
States, 498 U.S. 103, 119-20 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S.
836, 864 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 529 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 201-02 (1990) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
893 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Reeves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 77
(1990) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 648, 649 n.5 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt.
v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265 n.6 (1989); id. at 295 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting in part); Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69-70 (1989); id. at
78-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 301 (1989);
United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 961-62 (1.988) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 719 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Doe v. United
States, 487 U.S. 201, 221 n.2 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Regents of Univ. of Cal.
v. Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 485 U.S. 589, 598 (1988); McNally v. United
States, 483 U.S. 350, 370-71 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting); St. Francis Coll. v. Al-
Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610-12 (1987); United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 605 n.6
(1986); id. at 615 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 188 n.* (1983)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 516 (1981); id.
at 532 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 696 n.13 (1980); Nat'l
Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 480 & n.10 (1979); United States
v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 612 n.8 (1977); id. at 629-30 & nn.5-6 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 nn.20-21 (1976); Ullmann
v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 453 n.8 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Lamar v.
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This Note argues that old dictionaries are not reliable tools for
determining the meaning of a word at the time of the dictionary's
publication. Part I describes some of the pertinent aspects of the form
and intended function of older dictionaries and describes the
jurisprudential context in which these dictionaries often are used.
Part 11 of this Note outlines the jurisprudential objectives behind the
use of dictionaries and then discusses the theoretical and practical
objections commentators have raised to the use of dictionaries in
statutory interpretation. Part III revisits the objections to the general
use of dictionaries in statutory construction and relates them
specifically to the use of dictionaries as historical sources in statutory
interpretation. Part III also raises some new objections specifically to
the use of old dictionaries as neutral historical sources in statutory
interpretation. Finally, Part III offers a brief look at some of the
alternatives to old dictionaries. The Note concludes by suggesting a
more responsible use of old dictionaries in determining the
contemporary, common understanding of a word in a statute.
I. DICTIONARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE
This part of the Note provides some background information
relevant to the use of dictionaries in statutory interpretation. Section
A sketches a brief history of English lexicography from the eighteenth
century to today. Section A then identifies a few pertinent
characteristics of dictionaries. Section B describes the jurisprudential
framework within which judges typically use dictionaries.
A. Dictionaries in Context
1. A Brief History of Descriptive Lexicography
Philip B. Gove, editor of Webster's Third New International
Dictionary7 ("WNID3"), wrote soon after the dictionary's publication
in 1961 that it is the obligation of a dictionary to "act as a faithful
recorder and interpreter of usage"1 by "reflect[ing] the facts of usage
as they exist."' 9  Such a dictionary should provide an impartial
description of the common understanding of a word. However, not all
dictionaries strive to faithfully record and interpret usage. The
American Heritage Dictionary ("AHD"), the first edition of which was
United States, 241 U.S. 103, 113 (1916); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457,
584 (1870).
17. Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1961) [hereinafter WNID3].
18. Philip B. Gove, Linguistic Advances and Lexicography, Word Study, Oct.
1961, at 3, reprinted in James Sledd & Wilma R. Ebbitt, Dictionaries and That
Dictionary 65, 74 (1962).
19. Philip B. Gove, Controversy: About the Dictionary, 32 Am. Scholar 604, 605
(1963).
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published a few years after the WNID3, purports to help "the
ordinary user.., discover just how and to what extent his presumed
betters agree on what he ought to say or write. ' 20  The AHD
prescribes to the common dictionary user the understanding
uncommon people, the "presumed betters," have of a word. Such an
approach to lexicography is prescriptive rather than impartial and
descriptive.
The prescriptive approach to lexicography is not unique to the
AHD, and it is certainly not an innovation.2' In fact, when compared
to most English dictionaries published before the WNID3, the AHD's
prescriptiveness is practically inconsequential. Earlier dictionaries
were designed to serve a purpose very different from the WNID3's:
they were largely instructive rather than descriptive. The earliest
dictionaries instructed the user in unfamiliar languages and
terminologies. Later dictionaries instructed the user in how the
lexicographer felt English should be used. Impartiality was not a
characteristic thought relevant to dictionaries.
The earliest English dictionaries were bilingual, English-Latin and
Latin-English dictionaries22 that were used as teaching aids.23 Indeed,
the first known English-Latin dictionary, written perhaps as early as
1440, is titled Promptorium Parvulorum sive Clericorum.4 In 1553,
John Withals published A Shorte Dictionarie for Yong Begynners,
another English-Latin dictionary-cum-teaching manual. These
bilingual dictionaries served to instruct rather than to describe.
The earliest monolingual English dictionaries were not much
different. As the English language absorbed words from Latin and
other languages, its vocabulary grew fat with new "hard words,"
creating a need for a somewhat different dictionary.26 Robert
Cawdrey's A Table Alphabeticall...,27 written in 1604, is generally
considered the first monolingual English dictionary." As Cawdrey
explains later in the title of A Table Alphabeticall.... the dictionary
contains "hard usuall English wordes, borrowed from the Hebrew,
20. Morris Bishop, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language xxiv
(1st ed. 1969).
21. See generally Sidney I. Landau, Dictionaries: The Art and Craft of
Lexicography 244-54 (2d ed. 2001) (tracing attitudes toward linguistic correctness in
English lexicography and grammatical studies from the seventeenth century to the
twentieth century).
22. Id. at 45.
23. Id.
24. Id. Landau translates the title as "storehouse [of words] for Children and
Clerics." Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 47.
27. Robert Cawdrey, A Table Alphabeticall... (facsimile reprint 1966) (London,
1604).
28. Landau, supra note 21, at 43.
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Greeke, Latine, or French, &c. ''29 As with bilingual dictionaries, the
purpose of dictionaries such as Cawdrey's was to "teach[]"
uneducated people like "Ladies, Gentlewomen, or any other
unskilfull persons. " 3
Specialized dictionaries, including law dictionaries, also appeared in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 31 These dictionaries followed
in the pedagogical tradition of the non-technical dictionaries. John
Rastell's Expositiones Terminorum Legum Anglorum, published in
1527, was the first English law dictionary.32 The purpose of this book
was to teach "young students" legal terms.3 John Cowell's The
Interpreter, a legal dictionary published in 1607, was similarly intended
to teach "young Students" of the law the words they needed for
English legal practice. 34  This tradition culminated in later law
dictionaries like Giles Jacob's New Law Dictionary of 1729 and
Bouvier's 1839 American law dictionary, which David Mellinkoff
describes as "a quick substitute for a legal education" and "offering a
legal education," respectively.
Later, truly monolingual dictionaries were also designed to instruct
the reader, although in a different manner. These dictionaries tended
to present the lexicographer's conception of correct English usage.
Unlike bilingual and technical dictionaries, monolingual dictionaries
of general scope were often created with little regard to the way a
word was actually used; rather, they prescribed the usage the
lexicographer preferred.
During the eighteenth, nineteenth, and even the twentieth,
centuries, such linguistic prescriptivism abounded: it was a common
sentiment that language usage could be inherently right or wrong:
Attitudes towards language were heavily influenced by grammarians
who tried to apply to English the grammar of Latin, deeming
erroneous English constructions that did not mirror Latin
constructions. 37 Thus, for example, nineteenth-century grammarians
condemned the English split infinitive by analogy to Latin: because
the inflected Latin infinitive could not be split, the periphrastic
English infinitive should not be split.38 That split infinitives abounded
in English usage and were prevalent in the writings of such esteemed
29. Cawdrey, supra note 27.
30. Id.
31. Landau, supra note 21, at 48.
32. David Mellinkoff, The Myth of Precision and the Law Dictionary, 31 UCLA L.
Rev. 423,426 (1983). Of course, this was not an English language dictionary. Id.
33. Id.
34. John Cowell, The Interpreter 2 (facsimile reprint 2002) (Cambridge, 1607).
35. Mellinkoff, supra note 32, at 429-30.
36. Landau, supra note 21, at 244-54; see Edward Finegan, Attitudes Toward
English Usage: The History of a War of Words 47 (1980).
37. Landau, supra note 21, at 244-54.
38. American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1678 (4th ed. 2000)
[hereinafter AHD4].
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authors as Daniel Defoe did not exonerate English speakers of
offending against Latin grammar.39
Other grammarians and critics, believing the contemporary English
to be a degraded form of the language, strove to return English to an
earlier form.4" Jonathan Swift, for example, complained in his
Proposal for Correcting, Improving and Ascertaining the English
Tongue that "our Language is extremely imperfect; that its daily
Improvements are by no means in proportion to its daily Corruptions;
that the Pretenders to polish and refine it, have chiefly multiplied
Abuses and Absurdities; and, that in many Instances, it offends
against every Part of Grammar.""a Actual English usage was of little
importance to these grammarians, too; rather, they often considered
actual usage evidence of the deterioration of the language.42
Yet other grammarians sought to impose their own regional dialects
on the entire language.43 For example, William Dwight Whitney, a
lexicographer and linguist who otherwise aimed to describe rather
than prescribe usage," wrote that "the people of Ireland and Scotland
and of a part of the United States have long been inaccurate in their
use" of "shall" and "will. '4  Noah Webster, who was born and
educated in Connecticut, preferred the usage of the "eastern states,"
where, "among the unmixed English descendants," he wrote, he had
never heard "an improper use of the verbs will and shall. ' 46 Regional
dialects often informed grammarians' conceptions of "right" or
"wrong" usage, and they prescribed accordingly. 47
Politics also played a role in linguistic prescriptivism and attempts
to influence linguistic change. A desire to distinguish America
culturally from England provided one incentive for attempting to
manipulate the development of the language a.4  Noah Webster wrote
39. See id.
40. See Jonathon Green, Chasing the Sun: Dictionary Makers and the
Dictionaries They Made 255 (1996).
41. Jonathan Swift, A Proposal for Correcting, Improving and Ascertaining the
English Tongue 8 (facsimile reprint 1969) (London, 1712).
42. Landau, supra note 21, at 244. Indeed, it appears that vestiges of these views
survive as anachronisms in our Supreme Court. See infra note 101.
43. Finegan, supra note 36, at 41.
44. Infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
45. William Dwight Whitney, Essentials of English Grammar § 286, at 120
(facsimile reprint 1988) (Boston, 1877).
46. Noah Webster, Dissertations on the English Language 240 (facsimile reprint
1951) (Boston, 1789).
47. These attitudes toward "right" and "wrong" usage sometimes took on a moral
or quasi-religious character. Finegan, supra note 36, at 48 ("For many nineteenth-
century English speakers, linguistic purity was next to godliness."). One prominent
American grammarian explained his desire to teach grammar: "it must be the desire
of every benevolent and intelligent man, to see the advantages of literary, as well as of
moral culture, extended as far as possible among the people." Goold Brown,
Grammar of English Grammars 101 (New York, 2d ed. 1857).
48. Allen Walker Read, American Projects for an Academy to Regulate Speech, 51
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that "[a]s an independent nation, our honor requires us to have a
system of our own, in language as well as government."49
Accordingly, he titled his new dictionary An American Dictionary of
the English Language." Perhaps not surprisingly, Noah Webster has
recently been accused of exaggerating the differences between
English as spoken in America and in England.51 Even in his own time,
he was accused of trying to "regulate, not to record" the language, and
of "attempting to force his peculiar notions upon the world in his
Dictionary."52
On the other side of the Atlantic, lexicographer Samuel Johnson,
who felt strongly about Americans in general,53 was correspondingly
critical of the changes Americans made to the language. 4 For
example, Johnson objected to the meanings words like "creek,"
"gap," and "spur" had assumed in American geographical writings.
Accordingly, he did not include these meanings in his dictionary.56 In
effect, Johnson refused to confer legitimacy onto Americanisms by
refusing to record them. 7
Samuel Johnson also expressed partisan political views in his
dictionary. For example, Johnson defined "Tory" as "[o]ne who
adheres to the antient constitution of the state, and the apostolical
Proceedings of the Modern Language Ass'n of Am. 1141, 1147 (1936).
49. Noah Webster, supra note 46, at 20.
50. See Dennis E. Baron, Grammar and Good Taste 33 (1982).
51. Landau, supra note 21, at 70.
52. Review: An American Dictionary of the English Language (1859) by Noah
Webster and A Dictionary of the English Language (1860) by Joseph E. Worcester, 5
Atlantic Monthly 631, 632 (Boston, 1860) [hereinafter Atlantic Monthly Review]; see
Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language, at preface
(unpaginated) (New York, 1828) [hereinafter Webster (1828)].
53. See Bill Bryson, Made in America: An Informal History of the English
Language in the United States 73 (1994). Samuel Johnson is reported to have called
colonials "a race of convicts" who "ought to be grateful for anything we allow them
short of hanging." Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Webster's dictionary records "a small river" as an American usage of "creek."
Webster (1828), supra note 52. Johnson does not record this meaning. Samuel
Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (unpaginated) (facsimile reprint
1990) (London, 1755) [hereinafter Johnson, Dictionary]. Likewise, Webster records
under "spur," "In America, a mountain that shoots from any other mountain or range
of mountains, and extends to some distance in a lateral direction, or at right angles."
Webster (1828), supra note 52. Johnson has no corresponding entry. Johnson,
Dictionary, supra. The second edition of the Oxford English Dictionary provides an
example of "creek" with this meaning from 1622, 3 Oxford English Dictionary 1142
(2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter OED2], and an example of "spur" with this meaning from
1652, 16 OED2, supra, at 373, both from over a century before Johnson published his
dictionary. Neither Johnson nor Webster records a geographical meaning for "gap."
See Johnson, Dictionary, supra; Webster (1828), supra note 52.
57. Perhaps a less ill-humored example of Johnson's nationalist prejudices
appears in his definition of "oats": "A grain, which in England is generally given to
horses, but in Scotland supports the people." Johnson, Dictionary, supra note 56.
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hierarchy of the church of England, opposed to a whig."5 "Whig" he
defined simply as "[t]he name of a faction."59  Similarly, Johnson
defined "excise" as "[a] hateful tax levied upon commodities, and
adjudged not by the common judges of property, but wretches hired
by those to whom excise is paid."6 Clearly, Johnson did not intend
these definitions to be impartial descriptions of the meanings of the
words. The effects of Johnson's political views on his dictionary
extend even beyond his efforts to control linguistic change.
In America, partisan political views-particularly views on
federalism-affected efforts to determine linguistic development.
Thomas Jefferson refused an honorary position in the proposed
American Academy of Language and Belles Lettres, an institution
proposed to standardize American English, because such a
centralized, national institution conflicted with his anti-federalist
views.61 On the other hand, Noah Webster, a federalist,62 sought to
provide a unifying standard for American English through his
American Dictionary.63 In America, as in England, linguistic views
and politics were sometimes closely related, and lexicographers
expressed these views in and through their dictionaries.
Sentiments such as these resulted in calls to halt or guide linguistic
change through official institutions like the American Academy of
Language and Belles Lettres.6 John Adams, for example, proposed
that Congress create an academy called "the American Academy for
refining, improving, and ascertaining the English Language. '65  In
England, Daniel Defoe and Jonathan Swift, amongst others, proposed
permanently prohibiting the change of English through the
establishment of official, authoritative standards.66 In France, a
movement like these met with some success: l'Acadgmie franqaise
created its Dictionnaire, which was intended to permanently fix the
French language.67
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Read, supra note 48, at 1161.
62. See Noah Webster, An Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal
Constitution... (Phila., 1787) reprinted in Pamphlets on the Constitution of the
United States (Ford ed., Brooklyn, 1888).
63. Infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
64. See Finegan, supra note 36, at 20; see generally Read, supra note 48
(chronicling attempts to regulate English in the United States).
65. Read, supra note 48, at 1144 (quoting Letter from John Adams to the
President of Congress (Sept. 5, 1780)).
66. Finegan, supra note 36, at 20-21. Finegan quotes Daniel Defoe's proposal of
an academy that would "polish and refine the English Tongue, and advance the so
much neglected Faculty of Correct Language, to establish Purity and Propriety of
Stile, and to purge it from all the Irregular Additions that Ignorance and Affectation
have introduc'd." Id. at 20.
67. L'Acad~mie franaise, I'histoire, at http://www.academie-francaise.fr/
histoire/index. html (last visited Mar. 7, 2003); see also Landau, supra note 21, at 59.
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No official academy was instituted to fix the language in America or
England, however. Perceiving a void, American and English
lexicographers sought to provide their own standard.68 Samuel
Johnson proposed to make an English dictionary, "(t]he chief intent"
of which would be "to preserve the purity and ascertain the meaning
of our English idiom, '"69 much as had the "academicians of France. 7
To this end, Johnson proposed to record the English of "the best
authors '71 but to "correct such impurities as might be found in them,
that their authority might not contribute, at any distant time, to the
depravation of the language. '72 Because Johnson believed the English
of the Elizabethan period to be the purest form of the language, he
found authority in authors from that period.73 Later changes to the
language Johnson considered deviations to be remedied.74 Upon
completion of his project, Johnson conceded that it was beyond his
power to restore English to its "golden age. '7 He modified his goals.
As he wrote in the preface to his dictionary, "it remains that we retard
what we cannot repel, that we palliate what we cannot cure.
7 6
Although few other lexicographers expressed their prescriptivist
goals quite as clearly as Johnson did, Johnson was by no means the
only lexicographer to attempt to change the development of the
language. Noah Webster endorsed the idea of an institution to fix the
language77 but thought that "such an Institution would be of little or
no use, until the American public should have a dictionary which
should be received as a standard work. ' 7' He of course proposed that
his dictionary should be this standard.79 Joseph Worcester, another
American lexicographer, wrote of his own dictionary, "if, instead of
tending to corrupt the language, it shall conduce to preserve and
promote its purity and correctness ... the author will feel that he has
no reason to regret having performed the labor." '
These lexicographers' sentiments were not universal, however.8 In
1857, Richard Chenevix Trench, Dean of Westminster, made a radical
68. See Finegan, supra note 36, at 21.
69. Samuel Johnson, The Plan of a Dictionary 4 (facsimile reprint 1970) (London,
1747) [hereinafter Johnson, Plan].
70. Id. at 5.
71. Id. at 19.
72. Id. at 29-30.
73. Johnson, Dictionary, supra note 56, at preface.
74. Id.
75. Id.; Johnson, Plan, supra note 69, at 28.
76. Johnson, Dictionary, supra note 56, at preface.
77. Read, supra note 48, at 1145.
78. Id. at 1164 (quoting Noah Webster) (citations omitted).
79. Id.
80. Joseph E. Worcester, Dictionary of the English Language vii (Boston, 1860).
81. Starting in the eighteenth century, the study of language slowly developed into
a scientific discipline with a corresponding focus on descriptions of languages and
their development. See Anthony Fox, Linguistic Reconstruction: An Introduction to
Theory and Method 17-36 (1995).
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proposal. 2 He called for a new dictionary that would serve as "an
inventory of the language, '"83 containing all the words of the English
language. Trench wrote that the lexicographer should be "an
historian... , not a critic." 4  Accordingly, Trench's lexicographer
would include all the words of the language; rather than "select[ing]
the good words of a language" and excluding the rest. 5 Trench's call
became a lexicographer's manifesto86 and eventually gave rise to the
Oxford English Dictionary (" OEDI").7
At about that time, dictionaries began to suffer a sea-change into
something rich and strange-some lexicographers began to aspire to
record actual usage. William Dwight Whitney, who would later edit
The Century Dictionary,8 wrote in his 1877 Essentials of English
Grammar that the author of a grammar "is simply a recorder and
arranger of the usages of language, and in no manner or degree a
lawgiver; hardly even an arbiter or critic."8 9 In 1858, the Philological
Society initiated its work on A New English Dictionary on Historical
Principles," adhering to the guidelines Trench had outlined." The
completed New English Dictionary was republished in 1933 as the
Oxford English Dictionary.'"92 The OED1 endeavored to "embrace[]
not only the standard language of literature and conversation,
whether current at the moment, or obsolete, or archaic, but also the
main technical vocabulary, and a large measure of dialectal usage and
slang." 93 The stated purpose of the Second Edition of the Oxford
English Dictionary ("OED2"), published in 1989, was to record "all
the common words of speech and literature, and ... all words which
approach these in character."94 Yet even the OED2 shies "the domain
of... slang and cant, which touches the colloquial." 95 Although the
field was far from immediately revolutionized, Trench's essay marks
the beginning of a profound change in the nature of English
lexicography.
Perhaps the most prominent example of this new sort of dictionary
is the WNID3, published over a century after Trench's essay. That the
82. Richard Chenevix Trench, On Some Deficiencies in Our English Dictionaries
(London, 2d ed. 1860).
83. Id. at 4.
84. Id. at 5.
85. Id. at 4.
86. Green, supra note 40, at 362.
87. 1 Oxford English Dictionary, at v (1933) [hereinafter OED1].
88. William Dwight Whitney, The Century Dictionary: An Encyclopedic Lexicon
of the English Language (New York, 1889-91).
89. Whitney, supra note 45, at v.
90. 1 OED2, supra note 56, at xxxv.
91. 1 OED1, supra note 87, at v.
92. 1 OED2, supra note 56, at xlv.
93. 1 OED1, supra note 87, at v.
94. 1 OED2, supra note 56, at xxv.
95. Id. at xxv.
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WNID3 succeeded in serving as "a faithful recorder and interpreter of
usage"96 is perhaps most clearly apparent in the reactions it elicited
upon publication.97 Soon after publication, the WNID3 was widely
disparaged for "cast[ing] the mantle of its approval over.. . corrupted
English"9 by attributing to words "senses that were not associated
with those terms 50 years ago."99  Many critics did not want a
dictionary recording the common, contemporary understanding of
words, especially not of common words. Even Justice Scalia derided
the WNID3 for reflecting the language as it was actually used:
"intentional distortions, or simply careless or ignorant misuse, must
have formed the basis for the usage that Webster's Third ...
reported."""' Scalia continued:
Upon its long-awaited appearance in 1961, Webster's Third was
widely criticized for its portrayal of common error as proper usage.
See, e.g., Follett, Sabotage in Springfield, 209 Atlantic 73 (Jan.
1962); Barzun, What is a Dictionary? 32 The American Scholar 176,
181 (spring 1963); Macdonald, The String Unwound, 38 The New
Yorker 130, 156-1.57 (Mar. 1962). An example is its approval
(without qualification) of the use of 'infer' to mean 'imply': 'infer' '5:
to give reason to draw an inference concerning: HINT (did not take
part in the debate except to ask a question inferring that the
constitution must be changed-Manchester Guardian Weekly).'
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1158 (1961).""
Thus it appears the editors of the WNID3 achieved their goal of
"stat[ing] meanings in which words are in fact used, not... giv[ing]
editorial opinion on .what their meanings should be.""'2 Even now,
over forty years after its first publication, the WNID3 is still
considered a "benchmark" in modern lexicography.")3
The conception of the role of dictionaries has changed significantly
over the last few centuries. This change reflects a general shift in
attitudes toward language and language change. However, it also
reflects a change in the understanding of the relationship between
lexicographers and their dictionaries and between dictionaries and
language. Whereas modern lexicographers are largely anonymous'
96. Gove, supra note 18, at 74.
97. See generally Sledd & Ebbitt, supra note 18, at 50-250 (compiling criticisms of
the WNID3).
98. The Death of Meaning, The Toronto Globe & Mail, Sept. 8, 1961, reprinted in
Sledd & Ebbitt, supra note 18, at 53.
99. Roy H. Copperud, English As It's Used Belongs in Dictionary, Editor &
Publisher, Nov. 25, 1961, reprinted in Sledd & Ebbitt, supra note 18, at 97.
100. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 228 (1994).
101. Id. at 228 n.3. Scalia, we must assume, also agrees with Macdonald that
dictionaries should record the "the elite['s]" perception of the language. Finegan,
supra note 36, at 124.
102. WNID3, supra note 17, at 4a.
103. Landau, supra note 21, at 3.
104. The editorial staff of the WNID3 numbered almost 150, and over 200 outside
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and their dictionaries intentionally impersonal, earlier dictionaries
were closely associated with their creators,105 and the books often
reflected the lexicographers' prejudices and predilections.0 6 Likewise,
whereas dictionaries were once intended to affect the language, they
are now largely expected to record and describe the language. Thus,
the impersonal, descriptive dictionary-the sort of dictionary that
would describe the common understanding of a word-is largely an
innovation of the twentieth century.
2. Some Characteristics of Dictionaries
Benchmark though it be, the WNID3 is not entirely innovative.
There are certain lexicographical practices that touch the creation of
all dictionaries, from Samuel Johnson's to the WNID3. Likewise,
there are certain characteristics intrinsic to all dictionaries. Even the
WNID3 is not free of its lexicographical heritage.
Perhaps the most direct link between the WNID3 and earlier
dictionaries is the inclusion of parts of earlier dictionaries in the
WNID3. Lexicographers, new and old alike, rely heavily on earlier
dictionaries for content."" The WNID3 of course drew heavily from
previous Webster's dictionaries.0  In creating his American
Dictionary, Noah Webster borrowed from earlier dictionaries.0 9
According to Sledd and Kolb, Noah Webster acknowledges his
reliance on Johnson's dictionary in more than twenty citations in the
first ten pages of the letter C. 110 In other cases, he copied entry words,
definitions, and quotations from Johnson without
acknowledgement.' Johnson himself started to write the first edition
of his influential dictionary in an edition of Nathaniel Bailey's
Dictionarium Britannicum interleaved with blank pages,"2 using
Bailey's Dictionarium as the foundation of his dictionary. In turn, the
experts were consulted. WNID3, supra note 17, at 6a-12a.
105. See, e.g., Atlantic Monthly Review, supra note 52.
106. Thus, Johnson defines "lexicographer" as "a harmless drudge." Johnson,
Dictionary, supra note 56.
107. As Sledd and Kolb put it, "[tjhe student who is squeamish about plagiarism
had simply better not study the old wordbooks." James H. Sledd & Gwin J. Kolb,
Johnson's Dictionary & Lexicographical Tradition: I, in Dr. Johnson's Dictionary:
Essays in the Biography of a Book 1, 4 (1955). Sidney I. Landau writes, "modem
lexicographers, though more discreet [than earlier lexicographers], depend heavily on
their predecessors as well, and often the line between using another dictionary as a
source or reference and copying its definition with trivial changes is a fine one."
Landau, supra note 21, at 45.
108. See Herbert C. Morton, The Story of Webster's Third 60-62 (1994).
109. Landau, supra note 21, at 72.
110. James H. Sledd and Gwin J. Kolb, Dr. Johnson's Dictionary &
Lexicographical Tradition: H, in Dr. Johnson's Dictionary: Essays in the Biography of
a Book 134,198 (1955).
111. Id.
112. Green, supra note 40, at 227, 233; Sledd & Kolb, supra note 107, at 4.
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1755 revision of Bailey's Dictionarium relied heavily on Johnson's
dictionary." 3 Copying from previous dictionaries is simply part of
how dictionaries are made." 1
4
Dictionaries are and always have been characterized by
chronological conservatism. Even dictionaries that are intended to
reflect the state of the language at the date of publication cannot do so
with accuracy. One cause of dictionaries' conservatism is that
lexicographers typically do not add a new word or meaning to their
dictionaries until they have compiled a sufficient number of citations
to support it"15 or until another dictionary includes it."6 Compounding
this effect, lexicographers are usually reluctant to include in their
dictionaries a word or meaning that they fear will soon be obsolete,
even if the word is sufficiently attested."7 Thus, for example, the
OED New Edition, which is updated quarterly online,"' added the
'computer network' meaning of "internet" and the related meaning of
"browser" only in June of 2001."1 The earliest attestation the OED
New Edition provides for "internet" with this meaning is 1968, and the
earliest listed attestation of "browser" with this meaning is from
1969.121 Whether the editors feared the word would prove evanescent,
or whether they simply did not have sufficient evidence to support the
word's inclusion, in this case the Oxford English Dictionary lagged
behind the language by some thirty years.
Further perpetuating this conservatism, lexicographers intentionally
keep definitions free of time-specific qualities to delay obsolescence.
21
Yet, in so doing, lexicographers sacrifice some currency. The result is
that dictionaries may not describe the current state of the language,
even immediately after publication.
Many dictionaries are regularly revised so that they may better
describe the current form of the language. However, the date of a
dictionary's publication does not necessarily correspond to the date of
the most recent revision of the dictionary's contents.12 2 The Supreme
113. Green, supra note 40, at 234-35.
114. The same holds true for law dictionaries. For a history of copying in legal
lexicography, see D. S. Bland, Some Notes on the Evolution of the Legal Dictionary, 1
J. Legal Hist. 75 (1980).
115. Landau, supra note 21, at 202-05.
116. Id. at 214.
117. Id. at 204.
118. About the Oxford English Dictionary, at http://www.oed.com/public/inside/
(last visited Mar. 6, 2002).
119. Oxford English Dictionary News, June 2001, at http://www.oed.com/public/
news/0106.pdf. The OED2 was published in 1989. OED2, supra note 56. Neither of
these meanings was included then. See 7 OED2, supra note 56, at 1081-84; 2 OED2,
supra note 56, at 595.
120. OED Online, at http://www.oed.com (subscription internet service) (last
visited Mar. 6, 2003).
121. See Henry Bosley Woolf, Definition: Practice and Illustration, in Lexicography
in English 253, 256 (Raven loor McDavid & Audrey R. Duckert eds., 1973).
122. This publication practice has eluded the Supreme Court on at least one
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Court's use of Webster's Third New International Dictionary provides
an example of this publication practice. The WNID3 was published
first in 1961, and since then the Court has referred to eight different
publications of the dictionary.1 23 Still, the bodies of these books differ
only in the "[s]pecial updated Addenda Section of new words and
meanings.' 24  These repeated publications do not amount to a
revision; the publication date is no indication of currency.
The WNID3 thus shares some of the characteristics of its
predecessors, and, indeed, incorporates some of them. However, the
WNID3 is far from representative of its predecessors, many of which
were simply not intended to provide impartial descriptions of usage.
The modern dictionary user should bear both these differences and
these similarities in mind when turning to an old dictionary. These
characteristics determine the dictionary's ability to describe the
common, contemporary understanding of the meaning of a word.
B. Judicial Use of Dictionaries
Before the 1980s, the United States Supreme Court referred to
dictionaries in less than ten percent of its opinions in each Term."5
This figure has since more than tripled.1 26 This section describes the
jurisprudential grounds on which the Supreme Court now often cites
to dictionaries, particularly to old dictionaries. The Court's increased
use of dictionaries is tied to its search for the contemporary meaning
of the text, whether that text is a statute or the Constitution.
Not only the frequency of the Supreme Court's use of dictionaries
in statutory interpretation has increased in recent years;127 one
occasion. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 500 n.10 (1985), where
the court referred to two copies of the WNID3 with different publication dates as the
fourth and fifth editions of Webster's Third New International Dictionary.
123. E.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 490-91 n.4 (1996)
(1961 publication); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515
U.S. 687, 697 (1995) (1966 publication); Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510
U.S. 249, 258 (1994) (1969 publication); United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 71
(1-994) (1971 publication); Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 357 (1993) (1976
publication); O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 83 (1996) (1981 publication);
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 428 n.13 (1998) (1986 publication); Utah v.
Evans, 122 S. Ct. 2191, 2205 (2002) (1993 publication).
124. The Merriam-Webster website, at http://www.m-w.com/book/diction/w3.htm
(last visited Feb. 26, 2003). Earlier Webster's dictionaries also used an addenda
section, a practice criticized over a century before the WNID3 was published. Atlantic
Monthly Review, supra note 52, at 637. The Supreme Court has never referred to the
addenda section of any Webster's dictionary. Search of Lexis and Westlaw's United
States Supreme Court databases with the following search terms: "Webster* /15
addenda," "Webster* /15 addendum."
125. Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 Harv. L.
Rev. 1437, 1454 (1994) [hereinafter Looking It Up].
126. Id.
127. See Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a
Fortress: The United States Supreme Court's Use of Dictionaries, 47 Buff. L. Rev. 227,
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commentator has noted that the degree of the Court's reliance on
dictionaries has also increased, developing from a method of
identifying possible meanings of a word into the primary factor in
determining the outcome of cases. 2 ' The Court's reliance on old
dictionaries to determine the contemporary meaning of a statute has
also increased dramatically in recent years.1 29
This increase in dictionary use has been linked to a change in the
Court's method of interpreting statutes. 1' Over the past decade or
two, the United States Supreme Court has returned to a textual or
plain meaning method of statutory interpretation. 3  This "new
textualism,"'32 perhaps most vocally championed by Justice Scalia'33
but now accepted by an effective majority of the Court, 134 largely
limits the Court's interpretive resources to the text of the statute and
the larger body of surrounding law.'35 The new textualist Justices
eschew reliance on extrinsic sources like legislative history'36 or on any
other method of discovering an unexpressed statutory purpose or
legislative intent. Rather, they limit themselves to the text itself.137
When interpreting an older statute, new textualists seek the
"ordinary, contemporary, common meaning" of the statute,3 or the
meaning the statute would have to "a reasonably well-informed
citizen of the time."39 To better understand the "contemporary,
248-60 (1999).
128. Looking It Up, supra note 125, at 1440.
129. See supra note 16.
130. See Looking It Up, supra note 125, at 1440. But see David 0. Stewart, By the
Book: Looking up the Law in the Dictionary, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 46, 46
(comparing dictionary usage to juniority of justices).
131. Alan Schwartz, The New Textualism and the Rule of Law Subtext in the
Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, 45 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 149, 149 (2001).
132. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621 (1990).
133. Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, An Introduction to Statutory Interpretation and
the Legislative Process 52 (1997). Justice Scalia is not the only one to have expressed
ideas of this sort. Judge Easterbrook, for example, expresses many of the same ideas.
Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 61 (1994). Scalia, however, provides a convenient and
influential exposition of textualism in his essay. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts
in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the
Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of Interpretation 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
134. Schwartz, supra note 131, at 149; see Easterbrook, supra note 133, at 67
(finding that even judges not typically considered textualists sometimes bypass "clear,
direct intent of Congress" when it conflicts with plain meaning of text).
135. Mikva & Lane, supra note 133, at 52.
136. Id.
137. Scalia, supra note 133, at 25-27. This is the "particular methodology of
constitutional interpretation" Hovenkamp referred to. See supra note 10 and
accompanying text. "Justice Thomas's historical methodology was torn out of Justice
Scalia's notebook." Hovenkamp, supra note 9, at 2229 n.73.
138. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42-45 (1979). "A fundamental canon of
statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as
taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." Id. at 42.
139. Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in A Matter of Interpretation 65, 72 n.14 (Amy
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common meaning" of a statute when the meaning of its constituent
words may have changed, the new textualists endorse the limited use
of some extrinsic materials. For example, Justice Thomas looked
beyond the statute in question in his dissent in Rowland v. California
Men's Colony.4 °
Rowland required the Court to determine whether the word
"person" as it appeared in 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the statute governing
proceedings in forma pauperis, included non-natural persons. 4' The
majority held that, because the statute required that the person be
impoverished and because "[p]overty... is a human condition," the
statute did not apply to non-natural persons. 142  Justice Thomas
dissented because he "doubt[ed] that using the word ['poverty'] in
connection with an artificial entity depart[ed] in any significant way
from settled principles of English usage."'43 For examples of non-
natural persons described as "poor," Thomas quoted Justice Holmes,
two state court opinions, and an unrelated federal statute. 144 In these
usages, Thomas found support for his argument that the statute
should apply to non-natural persons as well as to natural persons.
When interpreting the Constitution, new textualists are willing to
look even further beyond the four corners of the text. For example,
Justice Scalia refers to the writings of contemporary theorists, framers
and non-framers alike, for insight into how the Constitution was
originally understood. 45 However, new textualists limit their extrinsic
sources to those that help make plain the meaning of the text or that
inform how the text would have been understood at the time it was
enacted. 46 To these ends, new textualists also turn to dictionaries to
identify the "plain meaning" of statutory or Constitutional terms. 147
Textualist analysis and the search for the contemporary meaning of
the text are of course not the exclusive domains of the new textualists.
Often the contemporary understanding of the text is one method of
interpretation used in conjunction with others. For example, in
determining the constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension
Act in Eldred v. Ashcroft,4 ' Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority,
first examined the text of the Copyright Clause with no aid other than
one modern dictionary and two dictionaries contemporary with the
Gutmann ed., 1997).
140. 506 U.S. 194, 212 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 196.
142. Id. at 203.
143. Id. at 218.
144. Id. at 219.
145. Scalia, supra note 133, at 38.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 78 (1992). Although the
methods and goals of statutory and constitutional interpretation differ, this distinction
is not relevant to the purposes of this Note. The implications of the use of
dictionaries are the same in both enterprises.
148. 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003).
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Constitution.'49 On the basis of these dictionary definitions alone,
Ginsburg concluded that, at the time of the framing, the word
"limited" as it appeared in the Copyright Clause "meant what it
means today: 'confine[d] within certain bounds,' 'restrain[ed],' or
'circumscribe[d]." ' 5"' Only after having determined that the CTEA
did not violate the text of the Constitution as it was understood at the
time of the framing did Justice Ginsburg turn to other tools of
Constitutional interpretation, namely history and precedent. 5' The
initial, textualist step of Ginsburg's approach is identical to the step a
new textualist would take. However, the new textualism would
require that Ginsburg's first step-interpreting the contemporary,
common understanding of the text-also be her last step. Ginsburg,
although not limiting herself to the new textualist method of
interpretation, began with an analysis that incorporated the new
textualist approach.
Because "the meaning of words may change over time,' '52 and
because a new textualist analysis should determine the contemporary
meaning of a word in a statute, new textualists often require an
extrinsic aid in interpreting the statute. Yet, the only extrinsic sources
consistent with the goals of the new textualism are those which shed
light on only the contemporary understanding of the language of the
statute. Accordingly, the Supreme Court often uses dictionaries
contemporary with the statute.' 53 The usefulness of a dictionary seems
obvious-the very function of a dictionary is often understood to be to
describe the meaning of a word at the time the dictionary was
published. Such a description would be entirely consistent with the
new textualist method of interpretation.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE PRACTICE
Tools like dictionaries would seem to facilitate the new textualists'
search for the common, contemporary understanding of a statute.
However, the Court's use of dictionaries has not gone without
149. Id. at 778.
150. Id. (quoting S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (7th ed. 1785)
and citing T. Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary of the English Language (6th ed. 1796)
and Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1312 (1976)).
151. Id. at 778-81.
152. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, Dep't of Labor v. Greenwich
Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 272 (1994).
153. See supra note 16. This practice is of course not limited to the Supreme Court.
As is the case with the new textualism in general, as it becomes an increasingly
popular interpretive method in the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts must also
adopt it. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An
Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 Colum. L.
Rev. 749, 752 (1995). Commentators too use old dictionaries to better appreciate the
contemporary understanding of a word. See, e.g., Thomas E. Plank, Bankruptcy and
Federalism, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 1063, 1077 n.5 6 (2002). However, the Supreme
Court's opinions serve as a convenient sample set for the purposes of this Note.
2194 [Vol. 71
2003] OLD DICTIONARIES AND NEW TEXTUALISTS
comment. This part of the Note surveys the relationship between the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence and dictionaries. Section A describes
the aspects of the new textualism that create the need for tools like
dictionaries as aids in statutory interpretation. Section B reviews the
primary criticisms of the Supreme Court's use of dictionaries.
A. A Defense of the Practice
As described above,'54 textualists avoid most extrinsic sources when
intepreting statutes and rely instead on the plain meaning of the text.
The tenets of this method of interpretation, as described in this
section, require rejection of reliance on many tools that could be used
in interpreting a statute when its meaning is not plain. As new
textualists sometimes find themselves needing some aid in
interpreting a statute, they turn to dictionaries.
One of the tenets of the new textualism is the rejection of the
significance of legislative intent.'55 Justice Scalia argues that it is the
law, as expressed in the text of the statute, that controls in a
democratic-or indeed in any fair-government.'56 Government by
an unexpressed intent is tantamount to tyranny'57 and "seems to
[Scalia] one step worse than the trick the emperor Nero was said to
engage in: posting edicts high up on the pillars, so that they could not
easily be read."' 158
More fundamentally, Justice Scalia rejects the very existence of a
legislative intent for most of the issues that confront the courts.
59
When drafting necessarily broad legislation, legislators do not
consider most of the finer points that ultimately concern courts.16°
Accordingly, there exists no legislative intent as to how the statute
should apply to the matters before the court. Any search for such
intent is necessarily futile, any clues necessarily false. 161
Additionally, the new textualists reject dependence on legislative
history in part on practical grounds.162  Even if one accepts the
divining of legislative intent as a valid jurisprudential goal, legislative
history, argues Scalia, will not reliably identify that intent. 63 The
components of the legislative history offer little insight into the
legislators' actual understanding of the provision. Scalia argues that
committee reports, for example, are largely unread by the legislators
154. Supra Part I.B.
155. See Scalia, supra note 133, at 16-23.
156. Id. at 17.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 32.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. Id. at 29-37.
163. Id. at 29-30.
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or even by the issuing committee. 164 Further, the sources of legislative
history are easily manipulated during their development. 16  For
example, Scalia is concerned that lobbyists routinely draft scripted
language that "sympathetic legislators" insert into committee reports
or read in floor debates. 66 Finally, the history of a piece of legislation
is likely to be so expansive as to afford a judge support for most any
desired result. 67 Indeed, Scalia finds the pursuit of legislative intent
to be little more than an excuse for judges to impose their own will on
the text of the statute, 68 whereas strict adherence to the text limits the
powers of a judge. 169
Justice Scalia is not the only jurist to articulate a defense of the
preference for the language of the text over other methods like
legislative intent. Judge Easterbrook, for example, expresses many of
the same justifications for rejecting the search for legislative intent
that Justice Scalia does. 71 Like Scalia, Easterbrook believes the
search for legislative intent gives the court more discretion and power
than "an objective inquiry into the reasonable import of the language"
would give.' This power and discretion results because a judge
searching for the original intent of the legislature must make a series
of subjective decisions.' Easterbrook has likened searching for
legislative intent to "rummag[ing] the minds of the drafters" and has
expressed concern that what judges "find there may have more in
common with the judges' beliefs than with the authors'.' 73
Thus, when textualists require an interpretive aid, they often turn to
dictionaries. Although dictionaries are extrinsic to the text of a
164. Id. at 32.
I frankly doubt that it is ever reasonable to assume that the details, as
opposed to the broad outlines of purpose, set forth in a committee report
come to the attention of, much less are approved by, the house which enacts
the committee's bill. And I think it time for courts to become concerned
about the fact that routine deference to the detail of committee reports, and
the predictable expansion in that detail which routine deference has
produced, are converting a system of judicial construction into a system of
committee-staff prescription.
Hirschey v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1,7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
165. See generally Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative
History Today, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1005 (1992).
166. Scalia, supra note 133, at 34.
167. See id. at 36.
168. Id. at 17-18.
169. See id.
170. Easterbrook, supra note 133, at 68 (arguing that there is no single legislative
intent behind a statute and that statutes do not cover every situation that confronts
the court).
171. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction,
11 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 59, 62 (1988).
172. Id.
173. Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358, 365
(7thCir. 1987).
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statute, the use of dictionaries could appear consistent with the new
textualist methods and goals. Dictionaries seem to offer a convenient
description of the usage and meaning of a word at the time of the
dictionary's publication-a description of how the word would have
been understood by the reasonably well-informed contemporary. A
dictionary does not purport to offer insight into some hidden,
monolithic legislative intent. Rather, dictionaries describe only
language, and it is the language of a statute that new textualists
concern themselves with. A dictionary would seem such a reasonable
tool that it is hardly surprising that the new textualists have not
articulated a cogent defense of its use in statutory interpretation. 174
No defense seems necessary.
B. Criticisms of Dictionary Use
Commentators have criticized the Court's use of dictionaries.
Criticism of the use of dictionaries in statutory interpretation follows
two lines. The first line of criticism, discussed in the first part of this
section, is methodological: judges have devised no consistent,
objective method for determining which dictionary to use and which
definition to apply.175  The second and more fundamental line of
criticism, described in the second part of this section, is that
dictionaries do not accurately reflect the meaning of a word in a
particular context.'76 This section is limited to a discussion of those
criticisms that are particularly relevant to the use of old dictionaries in
interpreting old statutes.
174. The Federal Circuit, for example, has justified its correlation of dictionaries'
definitions of a word to the common meaning of that word with conclusory statements
and appeals to precedent. E.g., Rocknel Fastener, Inc. v. United States, 267 F.3d 1354,
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("To ascertain the common meaning of a term, a court may
consult dictionaries." (internal quotation marks omitted)) (citing precedent); IBM v.
United States, 201 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("[W]e assume that the terms have
their ordinary meaning, for which we may consult a dictionary.") (citing precedent);
Best Power Tech. Sales Corp. v. Austin, 984 F.2d 1172, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("It is a
basic principle of statutory interpretation ... that undefined terms in a statute are
deemed to have their ordinarily understood meaning. For that meaning, we look to
the dictionary." (citation omitted)).
175. See Christian E. Mammen, Using Legislative History in American Statutory
Interpretation 15-16 (2002); Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary
Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 Ariz. St. L.J. 275, 310 (1998); Stewart, supra note
130, at 47; Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 127, at 285-86; Looking It Up, supra
note 125, at 1447-48.
176. Aprill, supra note 175, at 313; A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain
Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 71, 73-74
(1994); Looking It Up, supra note 125, at 1449-52; James L. Weis, Comment,
Jurisprudence by Webster's: The Role of the Dictionary in Legal Thought, 39 Mercer
L. Rev. 961, 962 (1988); cf. Aaron J. Rynd, Dictionaries and the Interpretation of
Words: A Summary of Difficulties, 29 Alta. L. Rev. 712, 716-17 (1991).
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1. No Consistent Methodology
Samuel A. Thumma and Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier have calculated that,
during the 1997-1998 Term, the United States Supreme Court cited to
some 120 different dictionaries. 177 Yet the Court has articulated no
system for choosing the dictionary to be used. 178 Nor has it furnished
a rationale for needing so many dictionaries. 79 The absence of any
discernable system is conspicuous.
Thumma and Kirchmeier trace the path a jurist must follow when
using a dictionary.' When looking up a word, first the dictionary
user must decide whether to use a general dictionary or a "special
field"'' dictionary. 1 2 In the case of the judicial use of dictionaries, the
choice is typically between a general English language dictionary and
a law dictionary.'83 Second, the user must decide which particular
dictionary to use."8 Third, the user must choose a specific edition of
the dictionary.'85 Finally, the user must choose the appropriate
definition.'86 Each step of this process requires the dictionary user to
make interpretive decisions.
The Court has drawn criticism at every step of this process. First,
the Court has failed to explain or imply a system for determining
whether to use a "special-field" dictionary or a general usage
dictionary.'87 Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia
Department of Health & Human Resources..8 illustrates the
significance of such a choice. That case concerned federal statutes
allowing courts to award attorney's fees and costs to the "prevailing
party. '"89  The issue before the Court was whether the term
''prevailing party" included a party that was not awarded relief by the
court but that nevertheless achieved the desired results because the
lawsuit led to the defendant's voluntary change in conduct. 9" Chief
177. Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 127, at 262.
178. See id. at 264.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 264-76.
181. Landau, supra note 21, at 32.
182. See Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 127, at 262-64.
183. But see, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 184 (1988) (referring
to a dictionary of business terms); Shields v. AtI. Coast Line R.R. Co., 350 U.S. 318,
326 n.2 (1956) (referring to The Car-Builder's Dictionary); Patapsco Ins. Co. v.
Coulter, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 222, 230 (1830) (referring to the Court's "best French
dictionary").
184. See Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 127, at 267-72.
185. Id. at 267-69; see, e.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225-
28 (1994) (referring to different definitions of the same word in different editions of a
dictionary).
186. Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 127, at 274-76.
187. See id. at 262-64.
188. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
189. Id. at 600.
190. Id.
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Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, cited to Black's Law
Dictionary and decided that a prevailing party was "one who has been
awarded some relief by the court."' 91 Thus, fees and costs were not
awardable. 192 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the dissent, cited to the
WNID3 in support of the contention that a party prevails when it
"achieve[s] actual relief from an opponent."'193 Accordingly, the
dissent would have found fees and costs awardable. 94 It would seem
that ultimately the choice between a general and a special field
dictionary depends on a judge's intuitive impression of whether a
word has a specific, technical meaning and then whether that technical
meaning should be applied.
After determining which sort of dictionary to refer to, the judge
must determine which particular dictionary and edition to use. The
Court similarly has no method for making this choice. 95 As Thumma
and Kirchmeier point out, the choice of dictionary has affected the
outcome of cases. 196 By way of example, they identify Farmer v.
Brennan,197 where the majority held that for an act or omission to
constitute punishment as contemplated by the Eight Amendment, it
must be accompanied by knowledge that the act or omission creates a
significant risk of harm.19 In his concurring opinion to that case,
Justice Blackmun argued that the word "punishment" need not imply
an identifiable punisher with a culpable state of mind. 199  He
supported this argument with definitions of "punishment" from
Webster's New International Dictionary and the WNID3.2 ° In a
separate concurrence, 1 Justice Thomas referred to Sheridan's 1780 A
General Dictionary of the English Language and argued that, "[a]s an
original matter," because the act or omission "was not part of [the
inmate's] sentence, it did not constitute 'punishment' under the
Eighth Amendment. '2" Thomas, using a different dictionary, found a
definition of "punishment" that was different from Blackmun S.203
After having decided on a dictionary, a judge must choose a specific
definition within that dictionary. The choice of a particular definition
191. Id. at 603.
192. Id. at 600.
193. Id. at 634.
194. Id. at 644. It is interesting to note that the only other opinion, a concurrence
by Justice Scalia, in which Justice Thomas joined, contained no references to
dictionaries. Id. at 610-22.
195. See Looking It Up, supra note 125, at 1448 n.77 (speculating that Justice Scalia
chooses an edition based on its prominence in his chambers).
196. Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 127, at 291.
197. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
198. Id. at 837-38.
199. Id. at 854.
200. Id. at 854-55.
201. Id. at 858.
202. Id. at 859.
203. Id.
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is therefore an interpretive choice, 2"4 and the Court has articulated no
systematic way of choosing the definition to be used.2 5 Indeed, any
such system necessarily would be either arbitrary or entirely
subjective.
As Aprill points out, the choice of definition can determine the
Court's holding.""1 To use Aprill's example, in Smith v. United
States,2 7 the Court referred to Webster's Second New International
Dictionary ("WNID2") to determine the meaning of "country" in the
foreign country exception to the Federal Torts Claims Act. 1 On the
basis of the first definition-"[a] region or tract of land"-and without
mention of the second definition-"a political state or nation" 2 9 -the
Court determined that the "sovereignless 211 1 Antarctica is a foreign
country.21' The Court provided no justification for relying exclusively
on the first definition,2 2 even though the second may have been more
appropriate to the context.
One commentator has noted that "[s]electing a dictionary and then
relying upon its definitions are themselves interpretive choices. '213
This criticism of dictionary use echoes one of Scalia's reasons for
eschewing reliance on legislative intent or history.24  Although the
spectrum of dictionaries and definitions may not be as broad and
divergent as the sources encompassed by the legislative history of a
statute, different definitions and different dictionaries can support
contrary opinions. Without a consistent method, a judge has almost
unbridled discretion in deciding which dictionary and which definition
to rely on. Likewise, the choice of a dictionary and definition can turn
on a subjective decision such as whether a judge chooses to interpret a
word as a term of art. Yet new textualists rely on a "solid textual
204. Cf Roger W. Shuy, A Lexicography Legacy of Fred Cassidy: Forensic
Linguistics, 77 Am. Speech 344, 346-48 (2002) (describing the importance of the
choice of definition).
205. In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), for
example, the Court and the dissent use different definitions from the same dictionary
to support their conclusions. Compare id. at 69-70, with id. at 78-79 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
206. See Aprill, supra note 175, at 298.
207. 507 U.S. 197 (1993).
208. Id. at 201.
209. Aprill, supra note 175, at 298 (quoting Webster's New International
Dictionary 609 (2d ed. 1945)).
210. Smith, 507 U.S. at 198.
211. See id. Randolph points out that Black's Law Dictionary provides a definition
that would have required the opposite result. Randolph, supra note 176, at 73.
212. See Smith, 507 U.S. at 197.
213. Rodney W. Ott, Note, Fact and Opinion in Defamation: Recognizing the
Formative Power of Context, 58 Fordham L. Rev. 761, 768 n.42 (1990).
214. See supra Part II.A. Unscrupulous exercise of this discretion has less
charitably been called "the dictionary shell game." Conversation with David Yerkes,
Professor, Colum. U., in New York, N.Y. (Nov. 11, 2002).
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anchor 2 5 to restrict a judge's discretion in interpreting a statute.2 6
The unrestricted discretion and the subjective decisions involved in
choosing a dictionary and definition are contrary to the methods and
goals of the new textualism.2 7
2. Dictionary Definitions Are Acontextual
A second and more fundamental criticism of the use of dictionaries
in statutory interpretation is that words do not have discrete,
immutable meanings independent of context.1 Yet it is just such a
meaning that dictionaries purport to provide. As commentators have
noted, the static definition from a dictionary will therefore be of
limited usefulness when applied to a particular statutory context.21 9
The meaning of a word can vary depending on the immediate
linguistic context and on the larger, social context. A. Raymond
Randolph states the objection nicely: "I think [dictionaries] are...
like 'word zoos.' One can observe an animal's features in the zoo, but
one still cannot be sure how the animal will behave in its native
surroundings. The same is true of words in a text. '' 22" The Court, it
appears, once agreed: "A word is not a crystal, transparent and
unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in
color and content according to the circumstances and the time in
which it is used. 221
Failing to recognize this limitation is to misunderstand the function
of dictionaries. It is the purpose of most dictionaries to present a
broad overview of various meanings of a word,222 typically for
consumption by a reader unfamiliar with the word.223 Dictionaries do
not purport to define the precise semantic boundaries of a word in
one particular instance, and a dictionary will not contain a definition
corresponding to every contextual meaning or usage of a word.224
215. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175,
1185 (1989).
216. See id.
217. See supra Parts I.B., II.A.
218. Supra note 176; see Ladislav Zgusta, Manual of Lexicography 47 (1971)
("Words do not have an abstract existence of their own as some unalterably defined
units of a system.").
219. See supra note 176.
220. Randolph, supra note 176, at 73-74.
221. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
222. See Zgusta, supra note 218, at 253 ("[T]he lexicographic definition enumerates
only the most important semantic features of the defined lexical unit.").
223. Landau, supra note 21, at 6 ("Dictionary definitions are usually confined to
information that the reader must have to understand an unfamiliar word.").
224. See Zgusta, supra note 218, at 47-59; see also Georgia M. Green, Pragmatics
and Natural Language Understanding 56 n.17 (1989). Green notes that
a survey of three arbitrarily chosen 200-word passages from works of
modern American fiction revealed that an average of 15% of the nouns,
verbs, and adjectives in them were used in senses that are not covered by the
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Thus, the use of dictionaries in statutory interpretation is not
without its problems. Methodologically, the absence of a principled
system for choosing a dictionary and definition provides the judge
with too much discretion and too little guidance. Practically, the
usefulness of the definition provided in a dictionary is limited because
a word derives much of its meaning from its context. For both of
these reasons, blithe reliance on dictionary definitions can subvert a
textual analysis.
III. OLD DICTIONARIES FOR OLD STATUTES
The criticisms of the use of dictionaries as interpretive tools, as
developed above,225 are especially apt when applied to the use of older
dictionaries. However, alternative methods are also problematic.
This part of the Note explores two methods used to ascertain the
former meaning of a word in an old statute. First, this part examines
the use of contemporary dictionaries in interpreting old statutes and
argues that old dictionaries are not effective tools for discovering the
former meaning of a word as used in an old statute. Second, this
section contrasts the use of old dictionaries to a broader, usage-based
method of determining the contemporary meaning of a word; yet, it
faults that method too. As they are typically used, neither method
proves a reliable tool for interpreting old statutes.
A. Old Dictionaries
The use of old dictionaries in interpreting old statutes, although
tempting, poses a number of problems. This section assesses some of
these problems. First, this section applies the general criticisms of the
use of dictionaries in statutory interpretation 226 specifically to the use
of old dictionaries. Second, this section identifies and explores some
characteristics inherent to all dictionaries that become problematic
when the dictionaries are old. Finally, this section identifies and
examines some troublesome characteristics peculiar to old
dictionaries.
1. General Criticisms Applied to the Use of Old Dictionaries
The new textualists' use of old dictionaries highlights how many of
the problems associated with the use of dictionaries in statutory
interpretation are exacerbated when the dictionaries are old. The
Court's lack of a system for choosing a dictionary and a definition
entries in a large desk dictionary. (The range was 7% to 29%.)
Id. These statistics are, of course, of little significance, as determining the extent of a
definition is inherently a subjective pursuit, but Green's point is clear.
225. Supra Part 1I.B.
226. Supra Part II.B.
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raises interpretive problems,227 and the inability of a dictionary to
indicate the particular significance of a word in a specific context
creates practical problems.228 These general objections to the use of
dictionaries in statutory interpretation take on particular importance
when judges use old dictionaries in interpreting old statutes.
a. No Consistent Methodology
The Court's failure to develop a principled system for deciding
which sort of dictionary to use, which particular dictionary to use, and
which definition to use,229 is particularly problematic when the case
involves older statutes and dictionaries. In the case of old statutes,
this problem is more troubling because the judge does not have an
intuitive understanding of the language. The judge thus lacks the
guidance of intuition when making the interpretive choices that can
have significant effects on a judge's conception of the meaning of a
statute.
The choice between a special-field or general dictionary230 is even
more problematic when the statute is old because the modern reader
may lack an intuitive sense of whether a word is a term of art. Smiley
v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.231 illustrates this issue. In that
opinion, the Court referred exclusively to legal dictionaries of the era
to determine whether flat fees on a loan constituted "interest" as the
term was used in the National Bank Act of 1864.232 In the next
paragraph of the opinion, the Court consulted both a contemporary
general usage dictionary and a contemporary legal dictionary to
determine whether a flat fee was a "rate" as the word appeared in the
National Bank Act.233 All this was done without comment and with
no readily discernable system.234
The issue is even more clearly apparent in Browning-Ferris
Industries of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. 235 In Browning-Ferris,
the majority and dissent disagreed on whether punitive damages
constituted "fines" under the Eight Amendment. The majority,
basing its argument largely on Cunningham's 1771 A New and
Complete Law-Dictionary,236 determined that civil damages fell
outside of the contemporary understanding of the word "fine" at the
227. Supra Part II.B.1.
228. Supra Part II.B.2.
229. Supra Part II.B.1.
230. Supra notes 181-94 and accompanying text.
231. 517 U.S. 735 (1996).
232. Id. at 745.
233. Id. at 746.
234. Id. at 745-46.
235. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
236. Id. at 265 n.6.
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time of the framing. 7 Justice O'Connor, dissenting in part, referred
to the sixth edition of Sheridan's A Dictionary of the English
Language, published in 1796, and the seventh edition of Johnson's A
Dictionary of the English Language, published in 1785-both general
usage dictionaries-in arguing that the contemporary understanding
of "fine" "was much more ambiguous" than the majority held.238
Thus, the case turned on whether a law dictionary or a general
dictionary was used. Here, unlike a case involving a modern statute,
the Justices cannot be expected to have an intuitive sense of whether
"fine" was commonly understood to bear a special meaning as a term
of art over two centuries ago. Thus, the absence of an objective
system creates even less coherent results. 239
Even when the choice is limited to general usage dictionaries, the
decision is significant: definitions vary substantially in these
idiosyncratic books. For example, James Stormonth's A Dictionary of
the English Language includes "reckless" in his definition of the
adjective "wanton,""24 " whereas a contemporary edition of Noah
Webster's An American Dictionary of the English Language makes no
mention of recklessness.24 Such a distinction could make a difference
to a modern judge.242
Finally, the absence of a method for choosing a particular definition
in an old dictionary is problematic. Although the Court has not yet
split in reliance on different definitions from the same old dictionary,
it is not unlikely that such a situation will arise. "Commerce" in Noah
Webster's 1828 Dictionary could provide for such a situation. As
Hovenkamp points out, Noah Webster's 1828 American Dictionary of
the English Language provides two definitions for "commerce. "243
237. Id. at 265.
238. Id. at 295.
239. One method that seems practical at first blush but that ultimately is of little
value lies in the subject labels like "mineralogy" that dictionaries sometimes provide
in their definitions. See, e.g., WNID3, supra note 17, at 16a-17a. Consistent with the
idea that general dictionaries reflect the common understanding of a word, the judge
would refer to special-field dictionaries only when the general usage dictionary marks
a definition with a subject label. Such a label would, in theory at least, indicate that
the common understanding of the word was that it had a special significance in a
particular field. In practice, however, it is not clear that the contents of legal and
general-usage dictionaries were or are now much different. See Mellinkoff, supra note
32, at 428, 431, 434, 436. Furthermore, many older dictionaries, intentionally or
otherwise, excluded jargon and terms of art. See, e.g., Johnson, Dictionary, supra note
56, at preface; Worcester, supra note 80, at v.
240. James Stormonth, A Dictionary of the English Language 1146 (New York,
1885).
241. Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 1490
(Springfield, Mass., 1869) [hereinafter Webster (1869)].
242. However, see Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 60 n.3
(1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), where the difference apparently was not relevant in
determining that "wantonness" connoted "actual malice." Id.; see infra notes 309-14
and accompanying text.
243. Hovenkamp, supra note 9, at 2229.
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The first definition-"an interchange or mutual change of goods,
wares, productions, or property.., either by barter, or by purchase
and sale; trade; traffick" 244 --is narrow, like Justice Thomas's
definition in his Lopez opinion.245  The second definition-
"[i]ntercourse between individuals; interchange of work,
business" 246 -is broader and does not support Thomas's conception of
the meaning of the word at the time of the framing. Although
Webster's American Dictionary is not strictly contemporary with the
Constitution, this entry, or another like it, could prove troublesome.
Apparently, the Court may have, albeit unsuccessfully, attempted to
develop a systematic way of choosing dictionary definitions.
Presumably in an attempt to adhere to some sort of system, some
Supreme Court opinions cite to the "primary sense" of a word.247 In
Rowland v. California Men's Colony,248 Justice Souter cited the
"primary sense" of the word "poverty" in the WNID2.249 Similarly, in
United States v. Ramsey,25 the majority referred to the "the most
common use" of the word "envelope" as "state[d]" by Worcester's 25'
and Webster's 25 2 dictionaries2 3 and Justice Stevens, dissenting, cited
to the "primary definitions given" by those dictionaries. 4 None of
the definitions cited to indicate that the meaning referred to has any
semantic primacy.255 As each definition referred to is the first
definition for the entry word, we must assume that the Justices
decided that the first definition corresponds to the "primary sense."
Such a decision is essentially arbitrary. The definitions in the WNID2
and Webster's 1869 dictionary are arranged historically, 256 and
Worcester does not indicate the order in which he arranged his
definitions.2 7 The order of the definitions provides no support for the
Court's preference for the first definition.
244. Webster (1828), supra note 52.
245. Supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
246. Webster (1828), supra note 52.
247. Rowland v. Cal. Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194
(1993).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 203.
250. 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
251. Worcester, supra note 80.
252. Webster (1869), supra note 241.
253. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 612 n.8.
254. Id. at 630 n.5.
255. See Webster's Second New International Dictionary 1919 (2d ed. 1942)
[hereinafter WNID2]; Webster (1869), supra note 241, at 454; Worcester, supra note
80, at 491.
256. WNID2, supra note 255, at xv ("The earliest ascertainable meaning is always
first .... "); Webster (1869), supra note 241, at vi ("An effort has been constantly
made to develop and arrange the several meanings and groups of meanings in the
order of their actual growth and history, beginning, if possible, with the primitive
signification."). It is unlikely that the Justices intended to refer to the chronologically
primary sense of the word.
257. See Worcester, supra note 80, at iii-vii.
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Ultimately, dictionary use is not amenable to a rigid system.
Rather, at each step of the process, the dictionary user must
determine based on an intuitive understanding of the language and
the relevant context which choice to make. Ideally, a judge using a
dictionary to construe a statute would identify and explain the
reasoning behind each choice. A modern judge construing an old
statute with the help of an old dictionary will not have the same
intuitive sense of the language of the statute and dictionary; therefore,
the modern judge's explanation of the reasons motivating each
decision is all the more necessary. Although a rigid, predetermined
system-like always choosing the oldest meaning of a word-would
be illogical, a subsequent explanation and justification of each
decision would be especially valuable when it is an old dictionary that
the judge uses.
b. Acontextual
Dictionaries, by their very nature, do not provide the precise
meaning of a word as it is used in a particular context."' Rather, it is
for the user to adjust the dictionary's definition to the context in a
manner that makes sense." 9 This aspect of dictionary definitions is of
even greater significance in older dictionaries. Indeed, Samuel
Johnson acknowledges this inevitable shortcoming in the preface to
his Dictionary of the English Language:
[I]t must be remembered, that while our language is yet living, and
variable by the caprice of every one that speaks it, these words are
hourly shifting their relations, and can no more be ascertained in a
dictionary, than a grove, in the agitation of a storm, can be
accurately delineated from its picture in the water.26"
The mechanical application of a dictionary definition to a word in a
statute may result in an awkward interpretation,2 6' an awkwardness
that may be compounded when the dictionary and statute are old.
Some large, modern dictionaries provide the user with quotations
and examples illustrating the use of a word in the quoted context,
thereby ameliorating somewhat the acontextualism of dictionary
definitions. Both the OED2 and the WNID3, for example, include
many examples or illustrative quotations containing the headword
with different meanings in an array of contexts. Such quotations and
examples provide the reader with some assistance in understanding
258. Supra Part II.B.2.
259. See Zgusta, supra note 218, at 264.
260. Johnson, Dictionary, supra note 56, at preface.
261. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 462 (1991) (holding that
LSD in blotter paper is a "mixture" based on dictionary definitions of "mixture").
See Lawrence Solan, When Judges Use the Dictionary, 68 Am. Speech 50 (1993), for a
critique of the Court's use of dictionaries in this case.
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some of the "different contextual nuances" of a word.262 With the aid
of these illustrative quotations, the reader can develop a better sense
of what the word might mean in the relevant context.263
Old dictionaries, however, do not provide the reader with the same
sort of illustrative quotations that new dictionaries contain. Many
significant old dictionaries provide no quotations at all. Justices
frequently refer to Thomas Sheridan' s264 and John Kersey's 265
dictionaries, for example, neither of which has illustrative examples or
quotations. This absence of illustrative, contextual uses of the word to
guide the user makes the use of definitions from old dictionaries even
more problematic.
Some older dictionaries, including Webster's 1869 An American
Dictionary of the English Language2 66 and Worcester's Dictionary of
the English Language,267 do provide quotations; however, because of
the prescriptive nature of older dictionaries, 68 those quotations that
are provided are of considerably less assistance to the reader.269
Indeed, a substantial number of the quotations in Webster's 1869 An
American Dictionary of the English Language come from poetry
composed centuries before the dictionary was compiled."" v Johnson's
express "purpose was to admit no testimony of living authours"; 271
accordingly, his quotations were also quite dated at the time of
publication. These sorts of poetic and archaic quotations provide little
assistance to the reader and place high demands on the reader's
"abstractive powers. ' ' 27 2
262. Zgusta, supra note 218, at 263.
263. See id. at 264 ("[The lexicographer] indicates only some examples which he
considers typical and leaves it to the abstractive power of the user of the dictionary to
form other combinations by analogy.").
264. Thomas Sheridan, A General Dictionary of the English Language (facsimile
reprint 1967) (London, 1780); e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 638 n.20 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Grady v. Corbin, 495
U.S. 508, 529 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
265. John Kersey, Dictionarium Anglo-Britannicum (facsimile reprint 1969)
(London, 1708); e.g., United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 50 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 614 n.7 (1993).
266. Supra note 241.
267. Supra note 80.
268. Supra notes 20-80 and accompanying text.
269. The WNID3 provides twelve examples of the adjective "wanton" with various
meanings in different contexts, and the OED2 gives approximately sixty quotations.
WNID3, supra note 17, at 2575; 19 OED2, supra note 56, at 882-83. Worcester
provides eight examples, all from Shakespeare, Milton, Addison, Roscommon, and
the New Testament (King James). Worcester, supra note 80, at 1645. Webster's 1869
dictionary has nine quotations, all from Shakespeare, Milton, Addison, Roscommon,
and Spencer (five of the quotations are the same as Worcester's). Webster (1869),
supra note 241, at 1490. See the Appendix, infra, for examples.
270. See supra note 269.
271. Johnson, Dictionary, supra note 56, at preface.
272. Supra note 263. A striking example is a quotation Johnson supplies for
"excise": "Excise,/With hundred rows of teeth, the shark exceeds,/And on all trades
like Cassawar she feeds." Johnson, Dictionary, supra note 56.
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Further, the illustrative quotations in old dictionaries may be of
small use even given analogous contexts. Johnson, for example, was
not particularly concerned with quoting his authorities accurately.
Rather, he would alter the quotation so that it conveyed the meaning
he wanted it to.273 Johnson also chose the sources of his quotations
carefully in accordance with his political views. For example,
Jonathon Green observes that Johnson never quotes Thomas Hobbes
in his dictionary. However, Hobbes does appear "in quotations in
which he is systematically refuted. 274 Quotations such as these have
the potential of misleading a modern reader.
It is naive to expect a dictionary to convey the precise sense of a
word as it is used in a particular context. Modern dictionaries that
include illustrative quotations do assist the user in understanding
some of the contextual nuances of a word. Old dictionaries, however,
often do not provide such assistance, and when they do, it is often
ineffective. Thus, the inability of dictionaries to convey the contextual
meaning of a word is even more problematic in old dictionaries.
2. Intrinsic Characteristics of All Dictionaries that Become
Problematic in Old Dictionaries
Certain characteristics intrinsic to all dictionaries in general make
them poor tools for discovering an earlier understanding of a word.
First, dictionaries are made by copying earlier dictionaries, thereby
preserving archaic words and definitions. Second, as Aprill
comments, the publication date of a dictionary does not necessarily
correspond to the date of the edition,275 an observation that takes on
added magnitude in the publication of older dictionaries. Third,
dictionaries are inherently conservative and therefore may not
accurately describe the current meaning of a word. This conservatism
is even more pronounced in older dictionaries. Although all
dictionaries, new and old alike, share these characteristics, the effects
of these characteristics are more profound when an old dictionary is
used to interpret an old statute.
a. Copying
Lexicographer Sydney Landau27 ' writes that "[t]he history of
273. Green, supra note 40, at 266. "If Johnson didn't like a quote, he changed it.
He would omit an opening phrase or amputate a conclusion and if a phrase didn't
convey the meaning he required, he had no scruples in rewriting it. Nothing was
sacred." Id.
274. Green, supra note 40, at 267.
275. Aprill, supra note 175, at 327.
276. Editor of The Cambridge Dictionary of American English (2000), The
Chambers English Dictionary (1992), The Doubleday Dictionary for Home, School,
and Office (1975), and International Dictionary of Medicine and Biology (1986).
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English lexicography usually consists of a recital of successive and
often successful acts of piracy. '277  This dependence on piracy or
copying is a characteristic shared by all dictionaries, new and old
alike. 278 Dependence on earlier dictionaries makes dictionaries poor
historical tools because the practice of copying perpetuates the
inclusion in dictionaries of words and meanings no longer current at
the time the dictionary was created.
The development of law dictionaries exemplifies this perpetuation
of archaisms. For example, Mellinkoff traces dictionary occurrences
of the word "doit"/"doitkin," a coin outlawed in 1416,279 from John
Cowell's seventeenth-century law dictionary"" through twentieth-
century Ballantine's and Black's law dictionaries.281 Similarly
Mellinkoff records that almost all the terms in John Rastell's 1527
Expositiones Terminorum Legum Anglorum survive in twentieth-
century law dictionaries, although the terms are now "largely unused.
Their law is long dead. 28 2 The words have survived for so long in
legal dictionaries for no other reason than that they had existed in
earlier legal dictionaries. Because lexicographers copy from earlier
dictionaries, dictionaries contain words and definitions that were not
current at the time the dictionary was published, potentially
misleading the modern dictionary user.
b. Editions and Publication Dates
Supreme Court Justices are sometimes very scrupulous about
choosing the dictionary and edition with a publication date close to
the date the statute was enacted; 213 yet, this practice is often of
deceptively limited value. 284 This practice is of even less value when
old dictionaries are used because some popular older dictionaries
were not only reprinted but even appeared in new editions without
any substantive change to the body of the dictionary.
The editions of Johnson's A Dictionary of the English Language
provide a fine example of this practice. Five editions of Johnson's
277. Landau, supra note 21, at 43; see Worcester, supra note 80, at iii, vi; supra
notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 107.
279. Mellinkoff, supra note 32, at 428-29.
280. Id. at 428, n.18.
281. Id. at 435. "Doitkin" appears recently to have lost currency. The sixth edition
of Black's contains the word, but the seventh does not. Black's Law Dictionary 483
(6th ed. 1990) (including "doitkin"); Black's Law Dictionary 499 (7th ed. 1999)
(including neither "doit" nor "doitkin").
282. Melinkoff, supra note 32, at 427.
283. E.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 228 (1994) (referring
to Webster's Second New International Dictionary (1934) in interpreting a 1934
statute).
284. Supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
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dictionary appeared in his lifetime.2"' The second edition, according
to Sledd and Kolb, is "essentially a reprint of the first," and the third
edition is largely a reprint of the second.28 6 In revising the dictionary
for the fourth edition, Johnson stated that "[s]ome superfluities I have
expunged, and some faults I have corrected. '2 7 In his advertisement
for the fourth edition, he wrote that he had "endeavoured, by a
revisal, to make [the dictionary] less reprehensible. 282 There is no
indication that he attempted to update the dictionary. It is even
unclear how many of the revisions that Johnson made were actually
incorporated into the fourth edition.29  The fifth edition of the
dictionary, published in 1784, Sledd and Kolb call "an unimportant
reprint of the fourth. '29" The sixth and seventh editions, published
posthumously, incorporate some two hundred "light[]," "casual[]"
changes Johnson made to the fourth edition,29' few of which Sledd and
Kolb find to have "any particular significance. '292 These two editions
of Johnson's Dictionary, published within a month of one another,
otherwise differ from each other only in format: the sixth edition is
two volumes quarto and the seventh is a single volume folio. 293 Thus,
at least in the case of Johnson's dictionary, not only was there often
no change in substance in successive editions, but when there was,
there is no indication that the changes were made to update the
dictionary rather than simply to refine style and correct error.
Accordingly, judges who carefully choose the printing or edition of an
old dictionary that is most closely contemporary with the statute risk
relying on a dictionary the substance of which far antecedes the
statute.
c. Lexicographical Conservatism
The inherent chronological conservatism of dictionaries 94 is
aggravated when dictionaries are used as historical tools. It is of no
small significance that modern dictionaries advertise the number of
new words they contain.295 Earlier lexicographers like Worcester,
Stormonth, and Johnson had no desire to make their dictionaries
285. James H. Sledd & Gwin J. Kolb, The Early Editions of the Dictionary, in Dr.
Johnson's Dictionary: Essays in the Biography of a Book 105,127 (1955).
286. Id. at 111.
287. Id. at 115.
288. Id. at 114.
289. Id. at 116.
290. Id. at 127.
291. Id. at 131.
292. Id. at 132.
293. Id. at 128.
294. Supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
295. E.g., AHD4, supra note 38, at viii (claiming "nearl'y 10,000 new words");
Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary vii (2d ed. 1997) (claiming "60,000
new entries and 75,000 new definitions").
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appear progressive-rather, their goal was that their dictionaries
appear authoritative and conservative.296 The inherently conservative
nature of dictionaries is thus compounded by the lexicographer's
intentional conservatism. The illustrative quotations Worcester and
Webster provide with their definitions evince this compounded
conservatism. Many of these quotations were centuries old even at
the time the dictionaries were published.297 A judge, seeking in an old
dictionary the meaning of a word at the time the statute was enacted,
may unwittingly apply a meaning that had become archaic well before
the statute was enacted.
These characteristics of dictionaries, although typical of dictionaries
in general, become pertinent only when a dictionary is used to
determine the meaning of a word at a particular time in the past.
Judges referring to a modern dictionary may rely on their experience
with the language to help them differentiate between the modern and
archaic words and meanings. However, when the language is
removed in time, judges cannot rely on the same innate understanding
of the language; therefore, judges are likelier to be misled by archaic
words and meanings appearing in older dictionaries.
3. Problems Unique to Old Dictionaries
Characteristics unique to old dictionaries create problems when old
dictionaries are used to determine an earlier understanding of a word.
These problems are largely a result of the form and intended function
of older dictionaries. First, and perhaps most significantly, the
lexicographers typically did not intend their dictionaries to convey the
common, contemporary meaning of a word.298 Second, lexicographers
once strove less for detachment than they do now. Accordingly, older
dictionaries may be tainted by the lexicographers' partial views,
sometimes in ways that may not be obvious to the modern reader.299
Finally, and perhaps most obviously, if a modern reader has difficulty
understanding the language of an old statute, the reader may also
have difficulty understanding the language of an old dictionary. These
problems make old dictionaries less appealing tools for interpreting
old statutes.
a. Linguistic Prescriptivism
The most significant problem with the use of old dictionaries in
statutory interpretation is that the creators of these dictionaries did
not aim to report the common understanding of the word. Rather,
296. See supra notes 40-42, 68-80 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
298. Supra notes 20-80 and accompanying text.
299. Supra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
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whether for political or ideological-linguistic reasons, many earlier
lexicographers intended their dictionaries to be prescriptive.""' Judges
therefore should not blindly trust these dictionaries to provide the
common, contemporary meaning of a word.
One of the effects of this prescriptive lexicography is that these
dictionaries were intended to be rife with obsolete words and
meanings-words and meanings lexicographers hoped to restore to
the language. Bailey, in his 1721 Universal Etymological English
Dictionary and 1730 Dictionarium Britannicum, included then-
obsolete terms."" Even more problematically, Johnson intentionally
excluded usage examples from "living authours. 3 2  Although
Johnson decided to exclude most "antiquated or obsolete words," he
proposed to include those that were used by the author with
''propriety, elegance, or force."33 Thus a word or meaning may
appear in Johnson's dictionary, not because it was widely used, but
simply because an author had used the word or meaning in a way that
appealed to Johnson's aesthetics. A modern judge, turning to one of
these dictionaries with the goal of discovering the contemporary
meaning of a word, may instead unwittingly apply to a word a
meaning it had not borne for centuries.
b. Political Lexicography
Politics made their way into dictionaries in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries far more frequently than they do today.3"4 The
contents of dictionaries reflected not only linguistic politics but also
unabashed partisan politics. Indeed, sometimes the definitions in old
dictionaries provide a better sense of the lexicographer's political
views than they do of the common contemporary understanding of a
word. In some cases, the influence of the lexicographer's personal
beliefs may be discrete enough to elude the modern judge but
significant enough to affect the outcome of a case.
Yet, ignoring Johnson's linguistic and nationalistic prejudices-
including his scorn for American English and his refusal to record
it3" 5-Justices of the United States Supreme Court have relied on
Johnson's dictionary in twenty opinions to provide the contemporary,
presumably American, understanding of a word." 6 In seventeen of
300. Supra notes 20-80 and accompanying text.
301. Landau, supra note 21, at 53-54, 56.
302. Johnson, Dictionary, supra note 56, at preface.
303. Johnson, Plan, supra note 69, at 28.
304. See supra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
306. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 778 (2003); id. at 804 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Utah v. Evans, 122 S. Ct. 2191, 2205 (2002); id. at 2214 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337 (2001)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Dep't of Commerce v. United States House of
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these twenty opinions, Johnson's dictionary is used to interpret the
United States Constitution.37  Every time the Supreme Court uses
Johnson's dictionary to interpret the Constitution, it risks
incorporating Johnson's anti-American sentiments into American
Constitutional jurisprudence.3 8 Every time modern judges rely on
these old dictionaries, they risk deciding a case on the basis of
outdated politics and prejudices.
c. Unintelligible Dictionaries
A final problem facing the modern judge using an old dictionary is
the lack of an intuitive understanding of the language. Indeed, this
problem seems obvious: if the change of the meaning of words makes
a statute potentially inaccessible, why should the definition in a
contemporary dictionary be any more accessible? Yet judges do
assume they understand dictionaries contemporary with a statute, the
language of which they assume they cannot understand.
Such a problem appears in Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Smith v.
Wade.3 9  Rehnquist relied on dictionaries contemporary with the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to demonstrate that the
word "wanton," as used in the standard for awarding punitive
damages, indicated the existence of malice or actual ill will.310
Rehnquist found the word "lewdly" in the definition of "wantonly,"
and in the definition of "lewdly" he found "wickedly. 33' Based on
this definition daisy chain, he concluded that "wantonly" "would have
Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 347 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); United
States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 335 (1998); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v.
Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 637 n.20, 638 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting); U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 858 n.7 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-86 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); Nixon v.
United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229-30 (1993); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 648, 649 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring) (1989); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 295 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part);
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 719 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 536 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Northern Pac.
Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 535 (1903); Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 619
(1902); Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434, 461 (1899) (Brown, J., dissenting);
Enfield v. Jordan, 119 U.S. 680, 684 (1887); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 584
(1870) (Chase, C.J., dissenting).
307. Only in Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. at 536, Keck, 172 U.S. at 461, and
Enfield, 119 U.S. at 684, is Johnson's dictionary used for a purpose other than
interpreting the Constitution.
308. Johnson was not the only lexicographer to express his political biases in his
dictionary. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
309. 461 U.S. 30, 60 n.3, 64 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
310. The word "wanton" does not appear in the statute, but Rehnquist seeks the
contemporary meaning of the word because it appears in cases contemporary with the
enactment of the statute as part of the standard for awarding punitive damages. Id. at
64.
311. Id. at 60 n.3.
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been understood by laymen to require some sort of evil or dissolute
intention. 31 2
"Dissolute," yes, but "evil" only in the same sense, not in a sense
requiring ill will: Rehnquist here appears to have misunderstood the
sexual and moral connotations those dictionaries attribute to the
words." 3 Worcester, for example defines the adjective "wanton" as
"[d]issolute; licentious; lewd; lustful; lascivious; libidinous;
lecherous. '31 4 A closer reading of this full definition does not support
the conclusion that "wanton" meant "malicious." Here, it appears,
Justice Rehnquist may have found the dictionary more obscuring than
illuminating.
Cass Sunstein has commented that excessive reliance on dictionary
definitions in general can result in "interpretive blunders." '315
Excessive reliance on old dictionaries poses additional problems: a
new textualist judge who seeks in an older dictionary the common
contemporary understanding of a word runs the risk of attaching to
the word a meaning it no longer bore at the time the statute was
enacted. Likewise, the judge who relies on old dictionaries may miss
the most appropriate meaning of a word simply because the
lexicographer disapproved of that use. Furthermore, by relying on
these dictionaries, a judge risks incorporating into our law political,
philosophical, and linguistic views long since rendered irrelevant.
Finally, the judge may simply misunderstand the dictionary and apply
to the statute a meaning not supported by the dictionary.
For the reasons discussed above, old dictionaries are not the tools
some judges understand them to be. Old dictionaries should be used
with a good deal of caution and careful reflection. Because of the
limited scope of many of the definitions in older dictionaries, the
absence of a particular definition in a dictionary should not be taken
to indicate that that definition was not prevalent at the time the
dictionary was published.3" On the other hand, the presence of a
particular definition does not necessarily indicate that that definition
was widely used, or even that it was still current, at the time of the
312. Id. Rehnquist's method-creating a chain of definitions-raises some
problems of its own. Because of the semantic breadth of some words, the additional
step can permit great mischief. For example, "wantonly," in its definition in the
OED2, can mean "wilfully," which in turn once bore the meaning "with good will." 19
OED2, supra note 56, at 883; 20 OED2, supra note 56, at 339. This creates an
uncomfortable standard for awarding punitive damages.
313. See the Appendix, infra, for the full definitions Justice Rehnquist referred to.
It is telling that Webster defines "whoremaster" as "[a] man who practices lewdness."
Webster (1869), supra note 241, at 1513.
314. Worcester, supra note 80, at 1645.
315. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L.
Rev. 405, 417 (1989).
316. As occurs in, for example, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 778 (2003)
(confining the meaning of "limited" in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution to
existing dictionary definitions).
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dictionary's publication.3"7 A new textualist judge, relying on the
definition in an old dictionary, may unwittingly attribute to an old
statute a meaning it never bore. Thereby, in an effort to avoid
applying the rule of man rather than the rule of law,318 the new
textualist judge may simply avoid applying any rule.
B. A Usage Based Method
Dictionaries are not the only method used with hopes of
discovering the contemporary meaning of words in an old statute.
Even within the new textualist framework, there are other means of
finding the contemporary, common understanding of a word in a
statute. As meaning is determined by usage, not by dictionaries,
usage can provide an understanding of meaning.
In his dissent in Moskal v. United States,319 Justice Scalia took a
usage based approach to determine the former meaning of a word.
The Supreme Court's Moskal decision turned on the meaning of the
phrase "falsely made" in the National Stolen Property Act, the
relevant portion of which was enacted in 1939.320 The Court held that
the term "'falsely made' encompasse[d] genuine documents
containing false information.""32 In his dissent,322 Justice Scalia looked
at the phrase "falsely made" as it appeared in earlier and
contemporary state statutes,323 earlier and contemporary state and
federal court decisions,32 4 and contemporary legal commentary. 5
From these sources, Scalia extracted the meaning of the phrase in the
legal language of the time.32 6 Scalia concluded that "[a] forged
memorandum is 'falsely made'; a memorandum that contains
erroneous information is simply 'false.' 3 27
This sort of usage based approach could provide a more accurate,
less biased understanding of the way the word was used in writing at
the relevant time. Such an approach allows the judge to see how the
word functions in a statutory or other legal context. The judge sees
317. As occurs in, for example, Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 230 (1993)
(reasoning, based on dictionary definitions, that the term "try" has considerably
broader meanings than commonly understood).
318. See Scalia, supra note 133, at 17.
319. 498 U.S. 103, 119-32 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
320. Id. at 105, 110, 123 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
321. Id. at 110 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia summarized the Court's
holding: "The Court's decision rests ultimately upon the proposition that, pursuant to
'ordinary meaning,' a 'falsely made' document includes a document which is
genuinely what it purports to be, but which contains information that the maker
knows to be false." Id. at 119 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
322. Id. at 119-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
323. Id. at 123-24 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
324. Id. at 124 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
325. Id. at 125 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
326. Id. at 121 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
327. Id. at 119 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the word without having to rely on another's interpretation of the
word, and the judge need not be concerned about a lexicographer's
biases, linguistic or otherwise, affecting the interpretation of the word
and statute. With such an approach, the judge acts as his own
lexicographer, not in the sense that he attributes to a word a particular
meaning, but in the sense that he examines evidence that will allow
him to describe the way a word is used and then apply that description
to the question confronting him.
This alternative, however, is plagued by some of the very problems
that textualists hope to avoid by using dictionaries: in choosing
sources, the judge must make a series of interpretive choices. Such
choices of sources are not dissimilar to the choices an intentionalist
judge makes when determining which components of a legislation's
history to refer to. The new textualists seek to avoid such judicial
freedom.
A return to the "commerce" chestnut and Thomas's Lopez
concurrence provides an example of the interpretive freedom a judge
may have in examining actual usage.32s In his concurring opinion to
United States v. Lopez, Justice Thomas found the original
understanding of "commerce" limited to "selling, buying, and
bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes."32 9 He supported
his definition largely with dictionaries contemporary with the
Constitution.33" As noted above, Thomas's was not the last word on
the subject.33 Of course, it also was not the first.
William Crosskey, for one, finds a much broader meaning for
"commerce" as the word was used at the time of the framing.332
Crosskey supports this definition with a broad survey of old
dictionaries, and, more prominently, with occurrences of the word
"commerce" in sources like newspapers, pamphlets, correspondences,
treatises, and legislative debates, amongst others.333 In this wide-
ranging examination of usage, Crosskey finds a broad definition of
"commerce" that conflicts with Thomas's.
Grant Nelson and Robert Pushaw, Jr.,334 using Crosskey's research
as a foundation,335 challenge Thomas's conception of the original
understanding of "commerce. '336  Nelson and Pushaw define
328. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
329. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-86 (1.995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
330. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring); see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
332. William Winslow Crosskey, 1 Politics and the Constitution in the History of
the United States 50-292 (1953).
333. See id.
334. Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause:
Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve
State Control over Social Issues, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1999).
335. Id. at 13 n.50.
336. See id. at 6.
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commerce as "the voluntary sale or exchange of property or services
and all accompanying market-based activities, enterprises,
relationships, and interests. 33 7 They find extra support for Crosskey's
definition in old dictionaries, including Johnson's,33 as well as in the
roughly contemporary usages of Englishmen like Daniel Defoe,
Adam Anderson, Adam Smith, and Malachy Postlethwayt 339 and
Americans like James Wilson, Alexander Hamilton, John Dickinson,
and members of the First Continental Congress.34
Randy E. Barnett, however, disagrees with Nelson and Pushaw's
definition of "commerce" and endorses instead Thomas's narrower
definition for the word.3 41 Barnett supports his narrower definition of
"commerce" in much the same way Nelson and Pushaw support their
broad understanding: he finds usages in the records of the
Constitutional Convention,342 state ratification debates,343 and The
Federalist Papers.34 4 In these sources, Barnett finds "commerce" to be
used exclusively in the narrower sense.345
Barnett also objects to Crosskey's methodology and to Nelson and
Pushaw's failure to remedy what Barnett sees as a defect in Crosskey's
method.346 Crosskey intended to exclude sources connected with the
Constitution so as to minimize the chances of contemporary political
biases affecting his results.347  Accordingly, Crosskey excluded
occurrences of "commerce" in Madison's notes from the
Constitutional Convention, one of the pillars supporting Barnett's
definition.348 Barnett, on the other hand, sought evidence "of how
persons used words when discussing the particular text at issue. '349
Because Barnett attaches value to a type of source that Crosskey and
Nelson and Pushaw reject, he finds a contemporary understanding of
the word "commerce" contrary to Crosskey's. 31
As these conflicting definitions of "commerce" illustrate, the result
337. Id. at 9.
338. Id. at 15 n.53.
339. Id. at 14-19.
340. Id. at 19-21.
341. See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U.
Chi. L.Rev. 101, 103-04 (2001).
342. Id. at 114-15.
343. Id. at 116-25.
344. Id. at 115-16. Of course, Barnett also relies on Samuel Johnson's A Dictionary
of the English Language. Id. at 113-14.
345. Id. at 104.
346. Id. at 104-05.
347. Crosskey, supra note 332, at 5-6. Thurston Greene had similar intentions for
his "compilation of documents and quotations from authenticated original sources
available to the framers, the Congress, and the ratifiers." Thurston Greene, The
Language of the Constitution, at xvii (1991). Accordingly, he also excludes James
Madison's non-public notes of the Constitutional Convention debates. Id.
348. See Barnett, supra note 341, at 114-15.
349. Id. at 107.
350. Id. at 104-05.
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of the sort of analysis Justice Scalia undertook in his Moskal dissent is
rarely as clear as new textualist judges may desire. This ambiguity is
largely a result of the various interpretive choices the reader must
make. The reader or judge must not only interpret the meaning of the
word as it appears in the sources; the judge must also identify the
permissible sources. The broad range of available sources and the
various possible readings of each occurrence of the word force the
judge to make a series of interpretive decisions. Further, the range of
sources and readings also gives the judge tremendous discretion to, as
the late Judge Harold Leventhal said in reference to searching
legislative history, "look over the heads of the crowd and pick out
your friends."35' This discretion is one of the evils Scalia seeks to
avoid by eschewing legislative history.352
At least some of these interpretive difficulties can be avoided,
however. As Geoffrey Nunberg suggests, the judge seeking the
common understanding of a term as reflected across the range of
specificities may find value in a large, computer-searchable corpus of
texts such as Nexis.353 A corpus that is sufficiently broad and diverse
will have a wide enough sampling of texts to afford, with manipulation
and linguistic analysis, a representative sense of a word's possible
meanings.354 Clark D. Cunningham, Judith N. Levi, Georgia M.
Green, and Jeffrey P. Kaplan used such an approach in determining
the current, ordinary meaning of "enterprise" as it appears in the
RICO statute.355 The linguists amongst the authors searched Nexis to
identify the range of usages of the word. 6  The linguists then
analyzed the results and categorized them grammatically and
semantically. 7 The information from this research provided the
351. Scalia, supra note 133, at 36 (paraphrasing Judge Leventhal).
352. See id. Even when the textualist has decided which sources to use, this
approach continues to pose difficulties. Particularly, if time has rendered a word in
the subject statute opaque, the same word in other contemporary statutes may be no
easier to understand. The same may hold true for contemporary commentary, case
law, or newspaper articles. If a contemporary dictionary entry is difficult to
understand, surely contemporary legal commentary is not considerably more
accessible. See supra notes 312-13 and accompanying text.
353. Geoffrey Nunberg, High Definition, American Lawyer 47, 48 (Jan. 2003).
354. See Douglas Biber, Investigating Language Use Through Corpus-Based
Analyses of Associated Patterns, in Usage-Based Models of Language 287, 288
(Michael Barlow & Suzanne Kemmer eds., 2000).
355. Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 Yale L.J.
1561, 1596-98 (1994) (reviewing Lawrence M. Solan, The Language of Judges (1993)).
356. See id.
357. See id. First, the linguists broke the occurrences of "enterprise" into two
grammatic categories: mass nouns and count nouns. Id. at 1596. They focused on the
count nouns, which they broke into two semantic categories: occurrences of
"enterprise" denoting an activity and occurrences denoting an entity. Id. at 1597.
They concluded that the RICO statute, which specified particular types of entities,
must have been intended to include only the "entity" meaning of the "enterprise." Id.
The linguists found that all the examples of enterprise as entities could be
characterized as having some sort of goal but that this goal need not be profit. Id.
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backbone for their investigation." 8
However, for practical reasons this method may be less valuable in
determining the former meaning of a word. There now exist few
historical, electronic corpora.359 Those historical corpora that are
computer-searchable do not provide the degree of chronological
specificity the pursuit demands.36 Until this deficit is supplied, the
approach taken by Cunningham, Levi, Green, and Kaplan is not
practicable for old statutes.
The new textualist judge is then left with little recourse but to
compile a collection of sources sufficiently broad-based to overcome
some of the interpretive problems.3 61  However, to collect, sort
through, and extract examples from these sources requires a
considerable amount of time, energy, and, not least, expertise. Then
remains the imposing task of analyzing the results-a task which, for
one word, took the experienced editors of the Oxford English
Dictionary over one month.362  The modern "intelligent and
informed ' '36 person, faced with these obstacles, may prefer to climb
Nero's pillar if only the law then might easily be read.3"
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, it may be that dictionaries and usage based inquiries
allow judges less freedom and discretion while providing greater
accuracy in construing statutes or the Constitution than do sources
like legislative history. However, like the falsified committee reports
that concern Justice Scalia, dictionaries--particularly old
dictionaries-may contain information that could mislead the judge
who seeks the common, contemporary understanding of a statute.
And, like legislative history, dictionaries require that judges make
interpretive choices.
These results are not consistent with the definition the Seventh Circuit had applied to
"enterprise": "an association having an ascertainable structure which exists for the
purpose of maintaining operations directed toward an economic goal that has an
existence that can be defined apart from the commission of the predicate acts
constituting the pattern of racketeering activity." Id. at 1589 (quoting Nat'l Org. for
Women v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 627 (7th Cir. 1992)) (citations omitted). This result
is also inconsistent with the plaintiff's dictionary-driven claim that in "its normal
usage, 'enterprise' includes virtually any type of organized venture." Id. at 1590
(citations omitted).
358. Based on this information, Cunningham et al. created a survey questionnaire,
which they distributed to university students and federal district court judges. Id. at
1598-99.
359. Landau, supra note 21, at 321.
360. See id. at 321-22.
361. Sourcebooks like Greene's, supra note 347, may provide a starting point.
362. It took the editors and staff of the Oxford English Dictionary over forty days
to sort through and digest all the collected examples of the word "set." 1 OED2, supra
note 56, at xliii.
363. Scalia, supra note 133, at 38.
364. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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However, that is not to say that dictionaries cannot be used
effectively in determining the contemporary, common understanding
of statutes. Although an old dictionary cannot conclusively establish
the meaning of a word at the time the dictionary was published, old
dictionaries can provide a useful starting point in determining the
contemporary meaning of a word. But, when referring to a dictionary,
a judge should acknowledge that the dictionary provides only a single,
refutable, piece of evidence. And, because reference to a dictionary
requires that the judge make a series of interpretive choices, the judge
should explain those choices.
The judge can check the evidence the dictionary provides against a
brief yet broad survey of contemporary usage. The purpose of this
shallow survey should be to test the dictionary definition; judges
should not hand pick usage examples for the purpose of shoring up
dictionary-driven arguments."' The quick survey may satisfy the
judge, or it may convince the judge that a more thorough study is
required. The judge should strike the appropriate balance. Again,
the judge should acknowledge the various interpretive decisions
inherent in the process. From the evidence provided by the
dictionaries and the survey of usage, combined with the contextual
evidence the statute yields, the judge likely can induce an accurate
description of the contemporary, common understanding of a word in
a statute while not forsaking entirely the tenets of the new textualism.
365. Cf. supra note 8.
[Vol. 712220
2003] OLD DICTIONARIES AND NEW TEXTUA LISTS
APPENDIX
Complete dictionary entries for Rehnquist's "wantonly" argument
in his Smith v. Wade dissent.366 Pronunciation and etymological
information have been omitted.
Joseph E. Worcester, Dictionary of the English Language (Boston,
1860):
WANTONLY..., ad.
In a wanton manner; sportively, or laciviously. Dryden.367
WANTON..., a....
1. Wandering; flying or moving loosely.
She as a veil down to the slender waist
Her unadorned golden tresses wore,
Dishevelled, but in wanton ringlets waved. Milton.
2. Sportive; frolicsome; playful.
A wild and wanton herd. Shak.
I have ventured,
Like little, wanton boys, that swim on bladders,
This many summers in a sea of glory. Shak.
3. Dissolute; licentious; lewd; lustful; lascivious; libidinous; lecherous.
A wanton, ambling nymph. Shak.
Men grown wanton by prosperity. Roscommon.
Ye have lived in pleasure.., and been wanton. Jas. v. 5.
4. Loose; unrestrained; unchecked; free.
How does your tongue grow wanton in her praise! Addison.
5. Luxurious; superfluous; exuberant.
What we by day lop overgrown,
One night or two with wanton growth derides. Milton.368
LEWDLY ... ad.
1.tlgnorantly; not learnedly; illiterately. Chaucer.
2. Wickedly; sinfully.
Yet lewdly dar'st our ministering upbraid. Milton.
3. Lustfully; lecherously. Ezek. xxii.11. 369
LEWD .... a....
. tlgnorant; illiterate; unlearned. R.Brune.
366. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 60 n.3 (1983).
367. Worcester, supra note 80, at 1645.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 834.
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2. Beguiled; wicked; unprincipled.
Lewd fellows of the baser sort. Acts xvii. 5.
3. Misled by lust; given to the irregular indulgence of animal desire;
lustful; lecherous; libidinous; salacious. Dryden.
Whatsoever is light and frothy, and much more whatever is lewd and
filthy, ought to be banished from the conversation
of Christians. Tillotson.
... "That lewd, which meant at one time no more than lay or
unlearned (the lewd people, the lay people), should come to signify
the sinful, the vicious, is not a little worthy of note." Trench.37
WICKED, a....
1. Evil in principle or practice; vicious; unjust; nefarious; irreligious;
impious; flagitious; sinful; profane; immoral; heinous; iniquitous;
bad;-used both of persons and things.
There the wicked cease from troubling. Job iii. 17.
He of their wicked ways shall them admonish. Milton.
Committing to a wicked favorite [Sejanus]
All public cares, and yet of him suspicious. Milton.
2. tMischievious; pernicious; baneful.
As wicked dew as e'er my mother brushed
With raven's feather from unwholesome fen
Drop on you both. Shak.
Syn.-Wicked is applied to any moral evil in character or action.
Wicked and sinful are mostly applied to offences against the laws of
God. A wicked or sinful action; profane language; an irreligious or
impious person or character; an unjust proceeding; a vicious practice;
flagitious conduct; heinous crime; iniquitous fraud. - See base,
heinous.37
WICKEDLY, ad. In a wicked manner; criminally; viciously;
sinfully; corruptly. Pope.372
370. Id.
371. Id. at 1669.
372. Id.
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James Stormonth, A Dictionary of the English Language (New York,
1885):
WANTON, a .... unrestrained; loose; indulging the natural
appetites; disposed to lewdness; running to excess; reckless; lively or
sportive, as 'the wanton wind'; quick and of irregular motions; in OE.,
luxurious; superfluous; not regular... WANTONLY, ad.... : lewdly;
without restraint; loosely373
LEWD, a.... given to lustful indulgence; dissolute; licentious;
impure; in OE., inferior; bad: LEWDLY, ad .... I"
WICKED, a.... addicted to vice; immoral; sinful; evil in principle
or practice; bad or baneful in effect; addicted to mischief;
mischievious... WICKEDLY, ad.... -syn. of 'wicked': bad; evil;
naughty; corrupt; vicious; iniquitous; criminal; guilty; unjust;
unrighteous; unholy; irreligious; ungodly; profane; atrocious;
nefarious; pernicious; abandoned; flagitious; flagrant; profligate;
heinous; base; villanous; impious; cursed; baneful.375
373. Stormonth, supra note 240, at 1146.
374. Id. at 555.
375. Id. at 1160.
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Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language
(Springfield, Mass., 1869):
WANTONLY, adv.
1. In a wanton manner; without regularity or restraint; loosely;
sportively; gayly; playfully; lasciviously.
2. Unintentionally; accidentally. [Obs.] Dee.376
WANTON... ,a....
1. Moving or flying loosely; playing in the wind; hence, wandering or
roving in gayety or sport; sportive; frolicsome. "Note a wild and
wanton herd." Shak.
She, as a vail, down to the slender waist,
Her unadorned, golden tresses wore
Disheveled, but in wanton ringlets waved. Milton.
2. Running to excess; loose; unrestrained.
How does your tongue grow wanton in her praise! Addison.
3. Luxuriant; overgrown. "In woods and wanton wilderness."Spenser.
What we by day lop overgrown,
One night or two with wanton growth derides,
Tending to wild. Milton.
4. Not regular; not turned or formed with regularity. "The quaint
mazes in the wanton green." Milton.
5. Wandering from moral rectitude; licentious; dissolute; indulging in
sensuality without restraint.
"Men grown wanton by prosperity" Roscommon.
My plenteous joys,
Wanton in fullness. Shak.
6. Especially, deviating from the rules of chastity; lewd; lustful;
lascivious; libidinous.
Thou art froward by nature, enemy to peace,
Lascivious, wanton. Shak.
Syn.-sportive; frolicsome; airy; skittish; frisky; coltish; lecherous;
lascivious; libidinous."'
LEWDLY..., adv.
1. In an unlearned or foolish manner; ignorantly. [Obs.]
2. Wickedly; wantonly.
3. With the unlawful indulgence of lust; lustfully.'
376. Webster (1869), supra note 241, at 1490.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 768.
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LEWD .... a....
1. Not clerical; pertaining to, or characterizing, the laity; laic; laical;
hence, unlearned; ignorant; foolish; simple. [Obs.]
Yea, blessed be always a lewed man
That naught but only his beleve can. Chaucer.
The almightiness of God standeth not in that he is able to do all that
our foolish, lewd thoughts may imagine. Tyndale.
2. Contemptible; vile; despicable; profligate; dissolute. [Rare.]
But the Jews, who believed not,.., took unto them certain
lewd fellows of the baser sort,.., and assaulted the house of
Jason. Acts xvii.5.
Great numbers of men were trained up in an idle and dissolute way
of life,.., and then, if not ashamed to beg, too lewd to work, and
ready for any kind of mischief. Southey.
3. Given to the unlawful indulgence of lust; dissolute; lustful; filthy.
4. Proceeding from unlawful lust; as, lewd actions.
Syn.-Lustful; libidinous; licentious; profligate; dissolute; sensual;
unchaste; impure; lascivious; lecherous.37 9
WICKEDLY, adv.
In a wicked manner; with motives and designs contrary to the divine
law; viciously; corruptly; immorally.
I have sinned, and I have done wickedly. 2 Sam. xxiv.17.380
WICKED ... a....
1. Evil in principle or practice; deviating from morality; contrary to
the moral law; addicted to vice; sinful; immoral;- said of persons and
things; as, a wicked king; a wicked woman; a wicked deed; wicked
designs.
Hence then, and evil go with thee along,
Thy offspring, to the place of evil, hell,
Thou and thy wicked crew. Milton.
Never, never, wicked man was wise. Pope.
2. Cursed; baneful; pernicious; as, wicked words, words pernicious in
their effects. [Obs.]
Wicked dew. Shak.
3. Ludicrously mischievious, or disposed to mischief. [Colloq.]
Pen. looked uncommonly wicked. Thackeray.
Syn.-Iniquitous; sinful; criminal; guilty; immoral; unjust; unrighteous;
unholy; irreligious; ungodly; profane; vicious; pernicious; atrocious;
379. Id.
380. Id. at 1513.
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nefarious; heinous; flagrant; profligate; flagitious; abandoned. See
iniquitous." 1
381. Id.
